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PREFACE 
Meeting international commitments to development co-operation such as the Millennium 
Development Goals, the Monterrey Consensus on financing for development and the Gleneagles 
G8 summit agreements to increase aid by around $50 billion per year by 2010 will require not 
only increased resources, but also their judicious use. In this context policymakers and others 
cannot limit their attention to the effectiveness of foreign aid alone; they must broaden the 
discussion to include the development-related impacts of a spectrum of rich-country policies, 
including those related to investment, trade, and international migration. Such policies can work 
at cross purposes on the ground in developing countries, thwarting poverty reduction and 
hindering economic growth. Yet in most cases the policy impacts have been studied separately or 
independently. The OECD Development Centre’s Policy Coherence activities address this 
knowledge gap by conducting well-defined country case studies of the interaction of rich-
country policies in poor countries (including their interdependence with local policies), in close 
collaboration with researchers and institutions in developing countries. To further that end, the 
Centre has asked leading experts to take stock of what is known about the impact of four key 
vectors of OECD member policies — those governing official development assistance (ODA), 
foreign direct investment (FDI), migration and trade — on development in poor and emerging 
economies. These four background papers, all of which will shortly be available publicly, 
provide a key input into the Centre’s Policy Coherence project. This paper is one of them.  
OECD-member policies do sometimes work at cross purposes in their development 
impact. For example, restrictions on developing-country exports under the recently terminated 
Multifibre Agreement (MFA) cost those exporters an estimated $50 billion annually, very 
roughly equal to annual foreign-aid flows to developing countries during the same period. 
Clearly this shows incoherence between trade and aid policies insofar as one objective of policy 
making is to promote economic development. The growing number of African doctors in some 
OECD members suggests another example. It reveals incoherence between foreign-aid policies, 
which seek to increase the supply of health services in poor countries and in many cases pay to 
train doctors, and migration policies, which selectively seek out doctors and provide powerful 
incentives for them to leave their home countries. Of course, OECD-member trade and migration 
policies have objectives other than promoting development in poorer countries, and citizens and 
policy makers may decide that in some cases those other objectives are more important than 
development. Yet at the very least, this project seeks to make more explicit the magnitude of the 
trade-offs among policies. What, in short, is the cost of policy incoherence? 
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In addition to identifying cases where rich-country policies work at cross purposes, a 
cross-cutting issue is whether policies are complements or substitutes. Policies to promote ODA 
and FDI, for example, are complementary if aid flows to a country (to finance port infrastructure, 
say) increase the attractiveness of that country as a destination for capital flows. Policies are 
substitutes if the effects of diminished flows from one policy can be offset by increased flows 
from a second. Many observers wonder whether the considerable remittance flows sent home by 
migrants might substitute for foreign aid flows, reducing poverty and financing investment. Of 
course, the complementarity of FDI and ODA or the substitutability of remittances and aid are at 
this point merely hypotheses. The project aims to study such interactions more carefully; this 
paper provides one input. 
 
Louka T. Katseli 
Director 
OECD Development Centre 
July 2006 
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RÉSUMÉ 
Augmenter les flux d’investissements direct à l’étranger (IDE) vers les pays en 
développement est une pierre angulaire dans les engagements pris en terme de développement 
international. Dans une telle perspective, cet article évalue l’état des connaissances en ce qui 
concerne : i) les facteurs qui conduisent les entreprises à construire des usines à l’étranger, et 
ii) l’influence que les autres politiques (notamment l’aide étrangère) sont susceptibles d’avoir sur 
ces décisions. Les deux principaux facteurs à l’origine des IDE sont tout d’abord une motivation 
« horizontale » (pour gagner l’accès aux marchés du pays récipiendaire) et une autre « verticale » 
(pour exploiter les différences de coûts de production à plusieurs niveaux de la chaîne de 
production). La littérature empirique (une grande partie d’entre elle se concentrant sur les flux 
d’IDE entre pays riches) énonce clairement que l’accès au marché est une motivation 
quantitativement plus importante que les coûts de production.  
Quelles sont les leçons à en tirer quant à la cohérence des politiques ? Les effets positifs 
des IDE sur la croissance dépendent de la capacité d’absorption du pays ; l’aide peut être utilisée 
pour promouvoir l’accumulation de capital humain tandis que les politiques commerciales 
peuvent faciliter l’orientation des exportations dans l’économie récipiendaire. Ces deux actions 
augmentent la probabilité pour un pays de récolter les fruits des afflux d’IDE. En particulier, les 
politiques d’aide peuvent avoir comme objectif d’améliorer les infrastructures de communication 
et la capacité institutionnelle du pays récipiendaire. Ces politiques attirent alors des IDE en 
retour, car elles réduisent les coûts de production et améliorent les perspectives liées aux gains 
de productivité. Finalement, la promotion des échanges entre pays pauvres (afin d’élargir l’accès 
au marché représenté par une destination d’IDE donnée) et les améliorations provisoires de 
l’accès unilatéral au marché accordé par les pays riches sont susceptibles d’aider à attirer des 
IDE. 
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SUMMARY 
Increasing the flow of foreign direct investment (FDI) to developing countries is a 
cornerstone of new international development commitments. Accordingly, this paper reviews 
the state of knowledge regarding i) the factors that lead firms to build a plant overseas and ii) the 
influence that other policies (notably foreign aid) might have on those decisions. There are two 
broad motives for FDI: a “horizontal” motivation (to gain access to markets in the recipient 
country) and a “vertical” one (to exploit differences in production costs at various points in the 
production process). The clear message of the empirical literature (much of it focused on FDI 
flows between rich countries) is that market access is quantitatively far more important than 
production costs.   
What are the lessons for policy coherence? Positive effects of FDI on growth depend on a 
country’s absorptive capacity; aid can be used to promote human-capital accumulation while 
trade policies can facilitate the export orientation of the host economy. Both of these actions 
increase the likelihood of reaping rewards from FDI inflows. In particular, aid policies can aim at 
improving a recipient country’s communication infrastructure and institutional capacity. These 
policies attract FDI in turn, as they lower production costs and improve the prospects for 
productivity gains. Finally, trade facilitation between poor countries (to enlarge the market 
access represented by a given FDI destination) and temporary non-reciprocal market access 
improvements granted by rich countries could help attract FDI.  
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I. INTRODUCTION1 
Policy coherence towards development is intended to take into account the 
interdependence of measures that rich countries take in favour of growth and poverty reduction 
in poor countries. The several dimensions of development policies should ideally not have 
offsetting effects, or at least those should be identified and precisely measured. 
In terms of policy coherence, the investment case is slightly specific. The policy objective 
regarding investment is to improve the returns to investment in poor countries, both domestic 
and foreign, with a particular goal to increase the flows of FDI directed to poor countries. Indeed 
one of the most striking stylized facts concerning FDI distribution across countries is that the 
large majority of the flows are going from rich countries to other rich countries, rather than to 
poor countries2. 
However, rich countries do not have many direct policy instruments to improve the 
amount of FDI received by poor countries, simply because it implies policy measures that have 
to be implemented in the host country rather than in the origin country. Bilateral Investment 
Treaties (BITs) are one of the rare ways rich countries can try to increase the amounts of FDI 
flowing to developing countries, by reducing ex ante the risks associated with opportunistic 
behaviour by host governments, and providing some rights to investors once they are settled in a 
country. There is a small set of papers empirically assessing the impact of BITs on FDI. UNCTAD 
(1998) does not find any statistical evidence that this type of measure actually attracts FDI in 
addition to traditional determinants, in a cross-section of more than a hundred host countries in 
1995. Hallward-Driemeier (2003) more recently confirmed this lack of independent effect of BITs, 
which seem to complement rather than substitute for the other determinants of a country's 
attractiveness, and notably its institutional quality. This study improves considerably on the data 
and method. It uses bilateral FDI flows over 20 years, which enables to study the real important 
question: whether those bilateral treaties increase bilateral FDI, once they are implemented. The 
author also accounts for potential endogeneity in the signing of BITs. Egger and Pfaffermayr 
(2004) find more positive effects in a recent study using similar data and methods, but include 
                                                     
1. The author is affiliated to Université de Paris Sud, CEPII, PSE Paris-Jourdan and CEPR. 
2  China is a recent exception to this phenomenon. Indeed the size of the FDI flows to this country in 
recent years has been impressive and improved the overall performance of the developing world in 
terms of FDI reception. In its most recent survey, UNCTAD reveals that the share of LDCs in global 
inflows of FDI in 2003 is only 23 per cent without flows toward China but reaches 30 per cent with 
them. 
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developed countries as receivers of FDI in their sample, contrary to Hallward-Driemeier (2003). 
To sum up, the current state of knowledge in this literature suggests that BITs are quite 
ineffective in boosting FDI towards poor countries. 
However other policy tools of developed countries have indirect impacts on poor 
countries attractiveness for foreign investors. Some of those impacts are intentional, with an 
explicit goal to improve the conditions under which investors operate in LDCs, some less so. I 
investigate here how two types of policies, aid and trade policies, interact with the objective of 
raising the FDI flows to poor countries, and perhaps raising the economic benefits that host 
nations can expect from foreign affiliates operations. I first summarise the current state of 
knowledge on the factors known theoretically and verified empirically to attract FDI. I also 
review in section III the evidence pointing towards the validity of the objective: The extent to 
which higher levels of received FDI indeed fosters development. In section IV, I study the impact 
of aid policy as an incentive for host countries to promote a better FDI environment, for instance 
by providing a better “institutional framework”, which has recently been shown to be critically 
important for sustained growth. Then I proceed to estimating whether different types of aid 
received attract FDI inflows. In section V, I study the interactions between trade policy and 
investment policies, with a particular focus on how improved access to rich markets raises 
income per capita, and how increased FDI can be a channel for this effect. Empirical evidence is 
also provided on the FDI response to trade policies. The last section concludes. 
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II. HOW TO ATTRACT FDI  
Attracting FDI involves policy measures that are not without economic or social costs. 
Tax breaks, subsidies, infrastructure improvements are examples of policy measures intended to 
raise the volume of FDI received that have a direct and measurable cost, especially in poor 
countries. It is therefore a very legitimate question to ask whether those costs are “worth the 
prize”, that is whether FDI received yields such substantive net economic benefits that it justifies 
this type of spending. Hanson (2001) derived in simple and clear way the theoretical conditions 
under which active FDI promotion policies are most likely to increase welfare of a developing 
economy. The main concerns about negative effects associated with incoming FDI in a 
developing country (recently modelled by Markusen and Venables, 1999) is the increased 
competition level imposed on domestic firms, that used to be sheltered from this competition by 
the amount of transport costs needed to export the good from the home country of the 
multinational. Put simply, positive spillovers to local overall productivity need to be all the more 
important that the negative competition effect is large. Note that the two effects are not 
independent, however, since it is quite likely that the adverse effect on local competitors will be 
stronger when the initial productivity differential is large. It is therefore key to gauge empirically 
the tools available to attract foreign investors, and the benefits to be expected. 
II.1 A General Framework of FDI Location Choice 
What are the determinants of the location choice made by a multinational firm for its 
production unit? The first analysis of how foreign direct investors locate their affiliates draws on 
the traditional endowments theory framework. When factors are mobile in this framework, 
perfectly competitive owners of capital locate it wherever the return of it is higher, that is, 
preferably in countries where it is scarce, the developing world. This North-South view of capital 
flows where only relative costs matter has been radically amended in order to better match with 
actual patterns of location choices. Three radical departures have been notably made with respect 
to the traditional paradigm. First, increasing returns and imperfect competition have been 
combined with the existence of transport costs to explain the existence of multinational firms 
locating affiliates abroad in order to be closer to consumers and gain market shares over rivals 
this way. This has been called the horizontal motivation for FDI, as first proposed formally by 
Markusen (1984). Second, different stages of production have been introduced in the analysis, 
with countries differing in the production costs for each of those stages, and multinational firms 
locating according to the patterns of comparative advantages of countries in each stage of 
production. Helpman (1984) first introduced a model of this type, which is commonly referred to 
as the vertical motive for FDI. There have been several attempts to provide a synthesis of the two 
modelling structures, notably by Markusen and Venables (1998, 2000). Let me summarise the 
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principal determinants of location choice that can be identified in such an integrated framework 
and that have been subject to empirical estimation in the large literature on the topic. I will 
follow a reduced-form approach here in order to give a wide-ranging framework that can 
account for the diversity of empirical implementations in the literature. Different formalised 
presentations can be found in Barba-Naveratti and Venables (2004), Markusen (2002) or Head 
and Mayer (2004) for instance. 
It is one of the most important finding of this literature that the pattern of trade costs 
across potential location sites is crucial in the strength of most determinants affecting location 
choice. Consider first demand: In a perfectly integrated economy, choosing a country rather than 
another has no effect on the level of demand faced by a firm, because distance, borders and space 
more generally do not matter for trade flows. Locations will therefore not offer different 
characteristics in terms of demand, and this variable will have no influence on relative 
profitability of different countries and therefore on the final choice. At the other extreme, if trade 
costs are very high, the firm chooses between isolated and quasi-autarkic “island” in terms of 
demand, which means that only local demand will matter in the choice. Of course, the reality of 
trade costs is somewhere in a middle range (see Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004, for a detailed 
account of the literature trying to estimate the level of those trade costs), and the construction of 
the demand variable needs to take into account those accessibility issues so as to discount 
demand in remote locations accordingly. The resulting determinant is known as the market 
potential, a well-known concept among geographers (Harris, 1954, initiated the concept) and 
rediscovered recently and more formally in theoretical and empirical work by economic 
geographers (Krugman, 1992; Fujita et al., 1999; Redding and Venables, 2004; Head and Mayer, 
2004; Hanson 2005, notably). As stated above, an important improvement of recent approaches of 
FDI is the inclusion of imperfect competition in the analysis. Here again trade costs are central in 
the intensity of competition faced in each alternative location by the affiliate. With zero trade 
costs, space is meaningless, and each firm faces the same level of competition in all locations, 
which renders the number and location of competitors inconsequential for the location choice. 
With positive trade costs, distance isolates from competition, which means that firms will, 
everything else equal, try to avoid regions with a large number of establishments in their 
industry. This tendency to avoid proximity to competitors has been recognised for a long time in 
location theory (see Fujita and Thisse, 2002; for an overview) and is often called the market 
crowding effect. 
Another set of determinants of location choice involves variables influencing production 
costs in the different locations. Labour costs are of course crucial in this respect but there are 
other determinants of costs that have been proposed in the literature. A recently popular 
hypothesis is that affiliates of multinational firms benefit from technological spillovers when 
locating near other affiliates in the same industry. If such spillovers exist, they can be expected to 
raise the attractiveness of places where the number of firms in the same industry is important for 
instance because proximity to competitors would increase productivity or reduce R&D costs due 
to the positive knowledge transmission from neighbouring firms. Note again that such forces can 
be at work only if space matters. Proximity to knowledge producers is valuable only if 
knowledge is hard to acquire over space. Distance-related frictions to knowledge transfers have 
been documented empirically in the literature using notably the location of patents' citation: Peri 
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(2005) is a recent example showing that such frictions are large. Technological spillovers will 
therefore push firms to cluster in the same locations. This incentive will counterbalance the 
market crowding effect mentioned above, through which proximity intensifies competition and 
therefore reduces profits. Another set of variables that can affect costs of production concerns 
investment incentives in general, which takes the form of regional policies in some areas like 
Europe. Regional policies can take the form of direct production subsidies for targeted regions as 
is the case in France with the Prime d'Aménagement du Territoire. Regional policy usually does 
not take the form of direct subsidies to the investor, but can have a similar indirect effect. Indeed, 
a large share of EU structural funds for instance is used to finance public transport and 
communication infrastructure in peripheral areas, which might lead to a reduction in production 
costs and therefore be beneficial to foreign investors. 
II.2 Two Types of Empirical Tools 
To summarise, the expected profit from locating in country i for a foreign investor will be 
a function of the market access of that country (MAi) which takes into account both the spatial 
distribution and ease of access to demand from i and the level of competition faced in i. Second 
come the cost component, (Ci), itself consisting of various elements, in particular factor costs but 
also institutional features or investment incentives of the host country that can influence 
production costs. Another important part of the cost function relates to the costs of intermediates 
faced in country i. Not only locally available intermediates are relevant again here of course. 
Easy access to a large pool of cheap intermediates in nearby countries is often a decisive 
advantage called the Supplier Access of country i. Market access is expected to influence profits 
and therefore location probability positively, while high cost will have a negative influence on 
the probability for a country to be chosen. Naturally, the set of determinants just outlined is not 
exhaustive and it seems difficult to capture accurately all cost-related variables for instance in 
this type of work that should enter Ci in an empirical exercise. Fortunately, an easy way to deal 
(at least partly) with this empirical implementation problem, first proposed by Head et al. (1995) 
is to use fixed effects (αi) for each alternative country i in the location choice set. This will ensure 
that all time-invariant characteristics of a country that make it attractive but are unobserved are 
nevertheless controlled for (for instance, the difference in skill composition of the labour force, 
the price of other inputs such as land, etc.). The expected profit yielded by location i for affiliate α 
in time t can therefore be described as: 
)(ln)(ln)(ln 21 aCaMAa ititiit ββα ++=Π   (1) 
The core of the empirical research on location determinants is an implementation of this 
equation, under various forms. Researchers estimate the influence of proxies for each of those 
variables using the individual firm location choice decision to estimate the relevant coefficient, 
using primarily the conditional logit econometric model. 
A last remark is in order here concerning the type of FDI for which equation (1) is 
relevant, under the now traditional horizontal/vertical distinction. Equation (1) has traditionally 
been used to study FDI of the horizontal-type. Because of its generality, it is however also 
relevant for vertical FDI. Suppose that firms are keeping design of the product in the home 
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country and locating actual production in another foreign country (the classical Helpman, 1984 
case). Location of the production affiliate will also be a function of market potential and costs. 
Even in the case of intermediate goods or semi-processed goods, market potential of the country for the 
affiliate seems relevant, although it now principally consist of the locations and size of other 
affiliates in the same firm that use its output in later stages of production. Even under the vertical 
motivation for FDI, not only the production costs are relevant: The economic geographies of 
demand and supply are also important, although most of the action might take place within the 
firm in that case. 
A large part of the literature lacking data on individual firms' decisions needed to 
estimate parameters in equation (1) directly, rely instead on various measures of aggregate FDI 
received by a country. Should it be in terms of flows or stocks, the total amount received will of 
course be related to the underlying profitability of country i, described in equation (1). A more 
fundamental modification generally introduced is due to the use of the bilateral dimension of 
FDI. Data sources like the OECD FDI database (used below), include both the receiving and the 
origin countries of the FDI flows. What are the changes in the estimated equation? First the pool 
of potential investors in the origin country must be taken into account. This is in general 
proportional to the GDP of the origin country j, reflecting the number of domestic varieties and 
firms that can potentially invest abroad. Second, the costs incurred when investing in a given 
country include information and communication costs about the host country, which obviously 
vary according the distance and other proxies of spatial separation between i and j. Again 
proxying for all determinants is impossible which suggests the use of fixed effects for each 
country of origin and destination in the sample. Then, building on (1) and on the arguments 
above, one can estimate a gravity-type equation of FDI flows as: 
ijtitjtitjiijt TransCodCγGDPγMAγααF lnPrlnlnlnln 4321 γ+++++=  (2) 
The above equation is related to the gravity equation in trade since it i) explains bilateral 
flows; ii) incorporates both size variables of the two countries; and iii) incorporates transaction 
costs variables which will include bilateral distance. Note however that the motivation for the 
key variables is quite different from the one explaining trade volumes. In particular, bilateral 
distance here will not be a proxy for freight costs (which would affect bilateral FDI flows 
positively everything else equal), but accounts for communication and other hindrances that arise 
when coordination must take place between much dispersed affiliates of the multinational firm. 
How will aid and trade policies affect the profitability of country i in equations (1) and 
(2)? Those are the questions that will be treated in sections IV and V. Aid policy can basically 
affect all determinants. It can improve the access to markets and the access to suppliers through 
the financing of projects lowering transport costs of firms in the country. It can also of course 
affect production costs in a country, through the improvement of supply conditions of local 
inputs (energy or communication for instance). The impact on costs can be more indirect, 
through the improvement of the business climate, if aid policy is designed and successful at 
curbing down corruption for instance. This relates to the last determinant's interaction with aid. 
The policies taken by developing countries' governments can be altered or influenced by aid 
policy and therefore change the volume and/or composition and effects of FDI. Trade policies 
will naturally mostly increase the market access of the receiving country towards countries that 
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alleviate their protectionist measures, thereby increasing its attractiveness in the eyes of foreign 
investors. 
II.3 Which are the Empirically Dominant Determinants? 
The principal debate in the determinants of location choice relates to whether firms seek 
essentially low-cost host countries or are more driven by proximity to large demand pools, and 
are willing to pay higher wages to produce there. This debate has received empirical answers in 
the literature, through the respective weight of market access and production costs in the 
location choice. 
Market Access 
Measuring market access of a given country in a given industry at a given period in time 
is not at all a trivial issue. The relevant market access for an investor is a measure of discounted 
demand to be expected from locating in i. But the precise measurement and discounting factors 
to use are subject to large discussions. The second issue is that the intensity of competition must 
be taken into account: Market access is also crucially affected by the spatial distribution of 
competitors. The difficulties raised by this issue are even more problematic (see Redding and 
Venables, 2004; Hanson, 2005; Amiti and Javorcik, 2005; Head and Mayer 2004; for discussions 
about this issue). The academic literature has made abundant progress in this field, which I 
review here. 
The first papers in the literature assessing the impact of market access on economic 
activity estimate how differences in market access translate into differences in factor rewards and 
more generally in economic development. By using the new economic geography modelling 
structure of market potential, Hanson (2005) shows that the spatial distribution of manufacturing 
wages in the United States is crucially determined by the quality of access to large pools of final 
demand. Redding and Venables (2004) extend the analysis and relate the level of economic 
development of more than 100 countries to the structural version of the market access variable 
suggested by theory. The explanatory power of their cross-sectional analysis is striking: market 
access explains between 35 and 75 per cent of worldwide variance in GDP per capita, depending 
on specifications. Head and Mayer (2004) use the same underlying theoretical modelling and 
very comparable structural estimation methods in an application to FDI flows. They relate their 
measure of market potential to location choices of Japanese multinational firms in the EU. They 
find that market potential- either in its most structural form or in more reduced form- is indeed a 
key driving determinant of those location choices, much more important than differences in 
labour costs or corporate taxes for instance. Figure 1uses their data to illustrate in the simplest 
way the impact of market potential as a driver of foreign investment.  
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Figure 1. Japanese FDI Stock and Market Potential in the EU Regions 
 
Source: Head and Mayer (2004). 
The horizontal axis reports a market potential (averaged over the 1985-95 period) index 
with respect to the Brussels region, which is the region having the top market potential in the EU 
under their measure. The vertical axis simply reports the number of Japanese manufacturing 
affiliates located in each region between 1985 and 1995 (both axes in logs). There is an overall 
clear positive influence of market potential in the attractiveness of EU regions for Japanese 
investors. Also interesting is the observation of some clear under-performing regions that are 
quite specific like the city-regions of Berlin and Hamburg, and the distinct over-performance of 
some regions in the UK and Ireland compared to their market potential. 
It could be argued that those findings are only relevant in North-North FDI flows. That is 
demand would important for investment in rich countries whereas cost differences would be key 
for FDI directed towards emerging economies like China. To measure and possibly challenge the 
empirical validity of this hypothesis, one can turn to Amiti and Javorcik (2005). They examine the 
relative importance of key determinants of foreign investment (of the change in the number of 
foreign firms present in a given province within a industry) in China: market size, factor costs, 
proximity of suppliers and lastly trade costs. Relying on data detailed at the industry 
(515 industries) and provincial (29 provinces) levels, they find that market access and the proximity 
of suppliers are the main factors explaining inward FDI flows in Chinese provinces. Doubling either of 
these factors leads to a 40 per cent increase in the entry of foreign firms, while doubling wages in 
a province would “only” reduce FDI received by 20 per cent. An interesting finding for our 
purpose is that the local part of the access to demand and access to inputs variables are 
particularly important in the location choice. This is probably due to a large remaining 
fragmentation of the Chinese market, documented recently in great detail by Poncet (2003). US 
FDI data collected by the BEA and documenting the motivation of locating foreign affiliates in 
developing economies also point out to this perhaps surprisingly prominent market access 
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motive: according to Mataloni (2004) 71 per cent of sales of US affiliates located in China are 
directed towards local customers in 2002. The corresponding figure is 87 per cent in India, and 
even a surprising 64 per cent in Mexico, a location that should host primarily vertical investment, 
motivated by re-exportation to the United States. 
Buch et al. (2005) investigate the determinants of German FDI location over the world. 
Once again their paper stresses that the market access motive for internationalisation is 
dominating. Buch et al. (2005) use the firm level data either directly at the individual level, or 
aggregated into industries, or total flows to each destination market. They use two alternative 
measures of market access determinants: local GDP- used in the majority of the literature on 
location choices until recently- and market potentials more recently introduced. Using macro 
data, it appears that German firms mainly go abroad for the stake of acceding to large and 
developing foreign markets. This result is obtained using the traditional GDP variable, and 
confirmed using the newly introduced market potential. The outcome is clear-cut: A 1 per cent 
increase in the size of a given foreign market is associated with a 1 per cent increase in the 
activity of the German firms in this location. Exploiting the industry-level detail, the previous 
dominance of the market access motive is confirmed, but the associated elasticity is highly 
dependent on the sector. It ranges from 0.5 in the Clothing industry to 1.6 for the Transport and 
equipment material. This does not come as a surprise: In labour-intensive industries producing 
items easy to ship abroad, the vertical nature of FDI is certainly dominant; in contrast, in the car 
industry, access to the local market is a key motivation. What those results tell us is simply that 
market access and cost determinants both matter, but that- overall- the most prominent one 
remains market access: It is highly unlikely that Mercedes-Benz cars sold in Europe will 
tomorrow be produced in Beijing. Last, Bush et al. (2005) run a firm-level analysis (controlling for 
the strong heterogeneity among firms), where they show that market access remains a key 
determinant. 
The Impact of Production Costs 
Becker et al. (2005) is a very recent example of study investigating the role of production 
costs in the location decision. They use two panels of German and Swedish multinational firms 
to investigate whether employment substitution between parent and foreign affiliates are due to 
differences in labour costs. Becker et al. (2005) find that a 1 per cent increase in the wage gap 
between German locations and CEECs’ ones translates into 900 fewer jobs in Germany and 5,000 
more jobs in affiliates abroad. While the magnitude of this impact might seem large at first sight, 
it remains limited in comparison with the 1 954 000 workers employed by German 
multinationals in Germany: a 20 per cent increase in the wage gap between Germany and the CEECs 
would cut employment in Germany by only 1 per cent in Germany according to their estimation. Those 
recent estimates refine earlier findings that labour costs are not the main determinant of location 
choice although they might be found to have a statistically significant impact. 
Production-cost gaps incorporate not only wage differences in wages or even differences 
in unit costs. Even restricting the attention to the labour market; differences in regulations if 
often mentioned as a determinant of location choices. Amiti and Javorcik (2005) estimate a fixed 
effect (controlling for unobservable characteristics of the firms) logit model, which explains the 
decision of the largest 10 000 firms in Europe to be present or not in a given location, depending 
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among other things on its labour market regulations. The latter variable is considered in absolute 
terms, and also relatively to the home country of the investor. Alternative locations are 14 of EU-
15 countries, three new members (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland), Bulgaria and Ukraine. 
Measures regarding the flexibility of the labour market rely on the Global Competitiveness 
report of the World Economic forum, as well as additional indicators compiled by the World 
Bank. Control variables regarding the host country are rather crude, too, and depart from the 
ones suggested by theory: Market size is proxied by the population of the host country, 
notwithstanding its living standard (we are quite far here from the refinements of the market 
potentials). Labour costs are proxied by the average wage. Property rights and business taxation 
are also proxied in a rather crude way. 
In addition to a positive impact of the size of the population, as well as a positive impact 
of the average wage (a counterintuitive although not rare result in the literature), the key result is 
that a more flexible labour market is increasing the probability of the presence in the host 
economy. Alternatively, the authors use a second specification addressing the size of the foreign 
locations, which confirms the previous findings and permits to quantify the impact of the 
regulations on the volume of investment: comparing the regulated French economy with the 
deregulated UK, the authors find a 12 to 26 per cent difference in the volume of investment, depending on 
the measure of the regulations. 
Another frequent claim considering FDI location choices from rich countries to poor ones 
is that developing countries can adopt “pollution havens strategies” to attract multinational 
firms of structurally polluting industries whose costs are increased in rich countries by more 
demanding regulations. Recent empirical evidence of such causation remains however limited: 
Busse (2004) investigates five highly polluting industries and 119 countries: he fails to identify 
any evidence that industries facing above-average abatement costs would relocate in pollution 
havens, and translate into net exports of the host countries. The only exception is the Iron and 
steel industry. Considering such results, the fears of race to the bottom on environmental 
regulations may well be exaggerated. Further evidence is provided by Eskeland and Harrison 
(2003), who test for the relationship between pollution abatement cost and inward FDI for 
Mexico, Morocco, Côte d'Ivoire and Venezuela. Results point once again to the fact that market 
size is the main determinant of FDI. Pollution abatement costs are insignificant in most cases. In 
addition, FDI is largely found in the literature to be more energy efficient and use cleaner types 
of energy than local firms. 
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III. IS ATTRACTION OF FDI A REASONABLE POLICY?  
There is now quite a lot of empirical evidence on the different benefits to be expected 
from large inflows of FDI. As stated in Barba-Navaretti and Venables (2004), the expected 
benefits of FDI for the host country cover first the additional investment and associated factor 
demand that may alleviate shortages of domestic investment or of local unemployment. The 
second type of effects is the changes in performances of firms operating on the national territory. 
First, because of a compositional effect, as the share of more efficient foreign affiliates rises in the 
economy, and second because of a positive feedbacks to the local firms, that may take a variety of 
forms (availability of more efficient inputs at a lower price, training and mobility of workers, 
knowledge spillovers- either voluntary or not-, imitation of efficient practices...). 
The literature can be divided in two broadly defined parts. First is the set of papers trying 
to estimate the impact of FDI inflows on overall economic performance of the developing 
country. The archetype empirical exercise in this literature is a growth regression, where the 
inward flows or stocks of foreign capital are added to the traditional set of growth-explaining 
covariates. The second set of papers focuses on the underlying mechanisms through which a rise 
of the presence of foreign investors fosters growth. In this vein, researchers have notably tried to 
estimate i) whether foreign affiliates exhibit performances superior to local ones in particular in 
terms of productivity, and exports; ii) the importance of presumed spillovers from foreign 
affiliates that would increase productivity, export propensity or other performance variables of 
local firms. Should those be important, one would expect to see, as a consequence a positive 
impact of FDI presence on local growth in developing countries. 
Contrary to a rather widespread belief, results in those two literatures are in fact not 
clear-cut and very much debated, although some recent and quite decisive progress has been 
made through the use of micro-level data in the second type of studies. 
 
III.1 Growth-type Regressions 
Typically, FDI variables on their own in growth regressions have insignificant or 
negligible effects. However the studies from the nineties have managed to find positive effects of 
FDI in cross-country growth regressions when FDI is interacted with another characteristic of the 
country. Those interactions are in fact quite directly relevant to our topic, since quite a lot of 
them can be affected by trade or aid policies. 
In the most cited work on the topic, Borensztein et al. (1998) have results that mostly 
emphasise that the positive impact of FDI on growth in a panel of 69 developing countries over 
the 1970-89 period is totally dependent on the level of human capital of the receiving country 
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(measured with the Barro-Lee index). In countries with very low levels of education, the impact 
of FDI on growth is in fact even negative. This suggests that the channel through which FDI is 
beneficial to growth is transmission of knowledge which requires absorptive capacity. This 
feeling is reinforced by the fact that FDI does not robustly add to the overall investment levels of 
developing countries in other of their regressions, while it seems to yield more impetus to 
growth than domestic investment (again in interaction with human capital). The message seems 
rather optimistic in our context, if aid policies from rich countries manage to improve the 
absorptive capacity of poor countries, notably through the rise in education level, private foreign 
investment seems more beneficial to the receiving country. Note that the education sector is one 
of the components of the social infrastructure sector identified in the aid data from OECD used 
later in this paper. A related question, again very relevant to the policy coherence objective 
concerns the complementarity or substitution relationship that FDI and aid flows can have for a 
given objective, economic growth here. This would involve comparing the impact of aid and FDI 
variables in a growth regression for instance, and assessing their interactions, in the spirit of 
Borensztein et al. (1998), although more directly. This exercise has not been carried out yet to our 
knowledge. It would clearly be interesting and potentially insightful for the intense current 
academic debates concerning both the FDI/growth and aid/growth empirical relationships. 
Balasubramanyam et al. (1996) insist on the crucial role of the trade regime, broadly 
defined as Import Substituting or Export Promoting for obtaining the growth-effects of FDI. The 
basic motivation for their work is that the IS regime would introduce all sorts of distortions in the 
economy, notably on factor prices, that would both reduce the amount of FDI received because 
of the implied lower profitability and the benefits associated with the amount received, through 
misallocated investment generating less knowledge spillovers to local firms. Both claims are 
disputable in theory since the protection of a large internal market might be an attractive 
characteristic to foreign investors, although probably not a very profitable long-term strategy, 
and the distortions imposed are generally favouring industries where governments think that 
spillovers are important (they also often impose explicit knowledge transfers from the foreign 
affiliate to local suppliers or associates in joint ventures). The authors classify IS and EP countries 
based on a import/GDP ratio threshold, and also use a World Bank classification. They find that 
EP countries have a larger effect of FDI on the growth rate between 1970 and 1985, the effect for 
IS being always insignificant. Note that this result is not confirmed by Borensztein et al. (1998) 
who find an insignificant interaction term on FDI and tariffs. 
All those simple cross country regressions are plagued with endogeneity issues, both 
because of omitted variable bias that raise simultaneously FDI and growth, and through reverse 
causality, since the market seeking motivation for FDI implies that foreign investors will be 
attracted by countries with a fast growth in income, everything else equal. Calderon et al. (2004) 
show for instance that economic growth seem to generate inflows of both greenfield and M&A 
FDI rather than the reverse. FDI however leads domestic investment, which might generate a 
virtuous circle, although neither FDI nor domestic investment seems to have a clear impact on 
future growth in their work. 
Carkovic and Levine (forthcoming) tackle those issues in depth using recent panel data 
GMM techniques as well as new and much improved data. Their conclusion is mostly 
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destructive of the previous results. The authors are able to construct a panel dataset with 
averaging data over each of the seven 5-year periods between 1960 and 1995, using several data 
sources. To summarise, they control for the joint determination of growth and inward FDI flows, 
country-specific factors, and other growth determinants, which results in a finding of mostly 
insignificant independent impact of FDI on economic growth. The use of the time dimension in 
the regression enables to control notably for country-specific fixed effects, which might explain 
why a given nation might have structural characteristics that make it both an attractive location 
for foreign investors and a rapidly growing economy. The objective is to find out the effect of an 
exogenous increase in foreign capital received on growth, and potentially, how other 
determinants of growth make this part of received FDI more effective in promoting growth (they 
notably study the interaction of FDI with level of education, trade openness and the level of 
development). Results show that the stand-alone effect of the exogenous part of FDI is only 
positive in the panel specification, and only when the openness to trade variable is omitted. 
Considering the impact of human capital interaction, the result of complementarity of 
Borensztein et al. (1998) is radically challenged. In the cross sectional regressions, none of the 
terms is actually significant, while the panel data procedure with fixed effects exhibits that only 
countries with low levels of education can benefit from FDI. Results are very similar when FDI is 
interacted with income per capita, contradicting the absorptive capacity hypothesis. Last, when 
interacted with trade openness, neither the FDI variable nor the interaction term enters 
significantly. In this type of growth regressions, as in others studying the impacts of openness, 
the lesson seems to be that the quality of the data and the method used actually matters a great 
deal and can cool down quite radically the initial enthusiasm. 
III.2 Performance-type Regressions 
The literature on the impact of FDI on the performance of national firms or industries is 
again not without controversy. There is first the question of whether the impact of FDI is mainly 
due to a change in the composition of resident firms (for instance because they are concentrated 
in increasing returns to scale, or knowledge-intensive industries, or because they are more 
productive even after controlling for their characteristics), or to spillovers to local firms. 
Although this distinction might be considered irrelevant for the impact on growth and welfare, 
the long-term potential beneficial effects are likely to be larger with the spillovers channel, which 
transmit what is frequently cutting-edge knowledge to the local set of entrepreneurs. This is 
certainly because of the expected benefits from this technology transmission mechanism that the 
literature has more and more shifted towards estimation of those spillover effects using firm-
level data on firms' performance, usually productivity (either labour or TFP) or exports. 
Here again the results in the literature depend crucially on the methods used. 
Unfortunately it seems that better data and methods usually reduce the estimated magnitude of 
spillovers to local firms. The first table of the meta-analysis paper by Görg and Strobl (2001) is 
quite instructive in this respect. They list a number of important studies, together with their 
characteristics, most importantly whether the study is industry-level or firm level and whether it 
is cross-sectional or panel data. The standard exercise in this literature is to assess whether TFP 
or labour productivity rises with local presence of foreign firms. They remark that “all but one 
study using panel data find statistically significant negative or statistically insignificant effects of 
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MNC presence on domestic productivity, while all but one cross-sectional study find statistically 
significant positive effects” (Görg and Strobl, 2001, p. F724). This pattern holds true in the meta-
regressions where other characteristic of the study are included. Aitken and Harrison (1999) is a 
leading example of such finding, in which the presence of foreign affiliates reduces the 
productivity of local Venezuelan firms. The pattern seems to be particularly frequent in LDC 
samples, as emphasised by Görg and Greenaway (2004) in their recent survey of the literature 
that covers a large set of papers with many different geographic samples3.  
While Hanson (2001) and Görg and Greenaway (2004) are representative of recent 
surveys concurring to this lack of robust spillover from FDI, some scholars find more supportive 
evidence from the data. Keller (2004) cites other and more recent micro-level studies that find 
statistically significant evidence of spillovers from FDI to local UK firms notably. He also quotes 
Keller and Yeaple’s (2003) study on US firms to emphasise that the industry composition of the 
individual firms investigated has an importance. An even more recent strand of the literature has 
investigated the presence of vertical linkages spillovers, through which foreign affiliates transfer 
knowledge to local suppliers in order to upgrade the quality of the intermediates used in their 
production process. Smarzynska-Javorcik (2004) provides positive evidence on a sample of 
Lithuanian firms, using a precise input-output matrix of local manufacturing industries to test 
for such spillovers. Görg and Strobl (2004) have recently provided an interesting result that 
enables to go further inside the black box of spillovers. They study whether the productivity 
evolution of firms in Ghana is higher when the firm is run by a manager that was working in a 
foreign affiliate immediately before, and find that it is the case if he worked in the same industry. 
Workers therefore seem to bring some knowledge with them, a knowledge that seem to be 
industry-specific. Blomström and Kokko (2003) also emphasise the importance of the human 
capital/FDI relationship for development. Some studies suggest that a threshold of human capital 
level is needed in the host country to generate positive spillovers from the presence of 
multinational firms. This might come from foreign investors installing more advanced 
technology only if the country has invested in sufficient absorptive capacity, but also through 
training within multinational firms followed by mobility to local firms. 
A last type of result relevant to us concerns the extent of spillovers depending on the 
export orientation of the host economy. Görg and Hijzen (2004) propose a very interesting 
analysis of spillovers from FDI to UK domestic firms from 1988 to 1996, where they are able to 
distinguish between firms that were involved at some point in exports and firms solely selling on 
the domestic market. They find that while exporting firms are not affected by FDI, domestic 
firms that never export are affected negatively. They also are able to distinguish between foreign 
affiliates that are primarily export-oriented and the ones that sell mostly locally. The former 
appear to provide positive spillovers to local permanent exporters, the latter is harmful for the 
productivity of local non-exporters. Kokko et al. (2001) study the export decision by Uruguayan 
firms using cross-sectional firm-level data in 1998. They can discriminate between MNE presence 
in import-substituting and export-orientated industries and they find that there is only evidence 
                                                     
3  The negative (or insignificant at best) coefficient on spillovers finding seem particularly robust in 
transition economies. Djankov and Hoekman (2000), Konings (2001), Zukowska-Gagelmann (2000) and 
Damijan et al. (2001) all mostly find negative results, using firm-level data. 
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for spillovers from the latter group of multinationals. While those last results seem more 
promising, the overall picture of those performance regressions remain mixed at best, since the 
positive effects seem to be particularly rare in developing countries, concentrated in high tech 
industries, sensitive to the methods employed, and generally small in magnitude. A more 
positive picture can be drawn from “interaction effects”, some studies finding spillovers to be 
larger, when absorptive capacities and export orientation in the host country are high. This 
sounds encouraging for policy coherence, since aid policy can be targeted at promoting human 
capital accumulation needed for absorptive capacity, and trade policy can of course contribute to 
enhance the export orientation of the host economy. More empirical evidence targeted on LDCs 
and dealing properly with methodological issues is however needed to check the robustness of 
those findings. 
A striking conclusion after the overview of the literature in this section is that most 
careful studies recognise that while, there might be a statistical association between inward FDI 
and growth, it seems impossible to invalidate the hypothesis that those two outcomes are 
affected by a common cause that might in particular relate to sound economic policies. The same 
doubt, although tempered, also arises concerning the size of alleged spillovers from FDI to the 
indigenous set of firms. When controlling for the fact that foreign investors “cherry-pick” the 
best profit opportunities when they invest in a developing country, the “true” impact on the 
productivity or exports of local firms is much lower if not negative in some case. This naturally 
leads most scholars to plead for more prudence in the investment promotion efforts of 
developing countries, and maybe for an international coordination, to avoid possibly wasteful 
tax or subsidy competition. A slightly more positive picture emerges when interactions with 
absorptive capacities or export orientation are accounted for, which suggest that policy 
coordination with measures that promote human capital accumulation and the improvement of 
trading opportunities might make FDI presence more delivering. 
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IV. HOW AID AND FDI POLICIES INTERACT  
How can aid allocation policy by rich countries help fulfil the investment objectives, that 
is improve the attractiveness of the host country to FDI? In other words, this question amounts to 
asking under which circumstances aid and FDI will be complements and under which 
circumstances they will be substitutes. Turning back to our framework of attractive policies listed 
above, we have to investigate how aid policy interacts or can be amended to influence in a 
positive way the other domestic characteristics and in particular policy measures that attract FDI. 
One of the important instruments here is the conditionality of foreign aid, through which rich 
countries' governments can try to give incentives to developing countries to improve their 
overall economic environment. For instance, by conditioning aid on measurable achievements in 
terms of corruption reduction or democratic progresses, which can be favourable factors in the 
location of FDI? 
IV.1 The Different Interaction Channels 
Aid, Corporate Taxes and Subsidies 
Aid received by developing countries can be seen as an additional source of budget 
revenue that can substitute for tax to finance certain expenditures. One could imagine then a 
relationship with the level of taxation, which is often presented as one of the determinants of 
location choice. 
In terms of sensitivity of location choices to differences in corporate taxes, the empirical 
literature points to clear-cut results. Tax differentials matter. The next and more fundamental 
question is: How large is the effect? A meta-analysis of the empirical literature conducted by 
Mooij and Ederveen (2003) and treating more than 350 point estimates, finds an average semi-
elasticity of FDI to tax rates around -3. 
The impact of subsidies emerging from the literature is much more mixed (and also much 
scarcer due to lower access to good quality information on such investment-promotion 
measures). Crozet et al. (2004) study individual location choices of 3902 affiliates of multinational 
firms over the period 1985-95. They focus on assessing the impact of French and European 
regional policies through the inclusion of investment incentives and structural funds in the 
location choice model. Results point to very disappointing impacts of both types of measure on 
the actual choices of investors. It should be noted that the story is different with uncoordinated 
subsidies. Head et al. (1999) show some evidence of competition tournaments taking place 
between states in the USA. 
In this framework, aid can be seen as conceptually equivalent to regional policy 
programmes such as the European structural funds subsidy allocation based on lagging levels of 
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GDP per capita among EU members. An interesting debate taking place in certain rich countries 
relates to fears of “double payment” from rich countries, facing strong tax competition from 
emerging or poor countries in addition to a substantial financial burden linked to aid flows. 
Baldwin and Krugman (2004) propose a very clear theoretical framework that helps to 
understand the issues at stake. In equilibrium, corporate taxes result from a game played by 
governments seeking to attract capital to their soil characterised by initial attractiveness 
characteristics. Remote or peripheral countries suffer from a low attractiveness due to a low level 
of market access, which handicaps their development and simultaneously explains why they 
have to adopt low tax rates. Centrally located countries, on the contrary, can take advantage of 
their good economic geography to tax at higher rates. The differences in tax rates are therefore 
endogenously explained by the same factors that motivate aid flows from central and rich 
countries to peripheral and poor ones. Conditioning aid flows on higher tax rates in those 
countries can run into a dangerous contradiction, with the first measure compensating for low 
attractiveness while the second one deteriorates it even more. 
Aid and Transport/Communication infrastructure 
A recent but dynamic literature explains how low levels of transport infrastructure can 
dramatically lower trade opportunities and development. Aid in this type of project could clearly 
attract FDI for those reasons. Limao and Venables (2001) is a recent paper that uses real freight 
costs data (as opposed to c.i.f/f.o.b ratios) to estimate the costs of particularly high transport costs 
on trading possibilities and therefore growth. They first find that landlocked countries have 
considerably higher transport costs (estimates of their first table show that those transport costs 
rise by almost 74 per cent for a landlocked country). Their subsequent gravity regression analysis 
confirms the importance of transport infrastructure and gives an estimate of the elasticity of 
trade flows with respect to the trade cost factor of around -3. They find that a country with the 
median level of transport infrastructure has 28 per cent higher trade volumes than one at the 
bottom 75th percentile, an increase in trade equivalent to being 1 627 km closer to trading 
partners. The costs of transit countries’ poor transport infrastructure are also estimated to be very 
large, calling for coordination or supranational programmes of improvement of those 
infrastructures. They last detail their findings on the sub-Saharan African trade and show that 
the poor quality of transport infrastructure is one of the leading determinants of the poor export 
performances of those countries. 
Dollar et al. (2004) recently provided interesting firm-level evidence showing that a low 
level of trade and communication related infrastructure, which they label the investment climate 
of a city, repelled foreign investors, and made local firms less likely to become exporters. 
Included in their variables are comparable measures over a large number of cities in Bangladesh, 
Brazil, China, Honduras, India, Nicaragua, Pakistan, and Peru about time to clear customs for 
imports and exports, time get a fixed telephone line and importance of power losses. All factors 
promote FDI very strongly when they improve, and the finding is robust to standard 
attractiveness determinants, in particular market access variables. The authors explain that the 
success in some Chinese cities and most notably Shangai in attracting FDI are largely explained 
by the higher quality of its investment climate. Their estimate imply that in Karachi, for example, 
the share of foreign-invested firms in the considered sectors would go from 1 per cent to about 
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20 per cent should the country reach the level of Shangai in terms of the variables mentioned 
above. 
Aid and Institutions 
While its methods are not unchallenged (see Rodrik, 2004), the literature estimating the 
impact that institutions have on economic development has been enormously influential. 
Initiated by Daron Acemoglu and co-authors (see IMF, 2003; and Acemoglu et al., 2001, for the 
original paper), a stream of results has shown that improving such institutions as the protection 
of civil and property rights, the level of economic of political freedom and the level of corruption 
tend to be associated with higher prosperity. Endogeneity of institutions to economic 
development has been the main question of interest here, and the ingenious use of historical 
determinants of institutions as instruments showing that causality runs the right way has shown 
that improving institutions favourable to investment is a possible and desirable policy for poor 
countries. Not surprisingly, thus, a number of authors have also studied the link between 
institutions and FDI. Such link could be seen as one channel through which institutions promote 
development in the modern era. Indeed, good institutions are supposed to exert their positive 
influence on development through the promotion of investment in general, which faces less 
uncertainty and higher expected rates of return. Because FDI is now a very large share of capital 
formation in poor countries (UNCTAD, 2004); the FDI-promoting effect of good institutions 
might be the most important channel of their overall effect on growth and development. There 
are several reasons why the quality of institutions may matter for attracting FDI. One is rooted 
on the results of the growth literature: By raising productivity prospects, good governance 
infrastructures may attract foreign investors. A second reason is that poor institutions can bring 
additional costs to FDI. This can be the case of corruption for instance (Wei, 2000). A third reason 
is that FDI yields sunk costs; making it is especially vulnerable to any form of uncertainty, 
including uncertainty stemming from poor government efficiency, policy reversals, graft or weak 
enforcement of property rights and of the legal system in general.  
A number of authors have empirically studied the impact of institutions on FDI. Wei 
(1997, 2000) pointed out corruption as a significant impediment to inward FDI, with both a 
strong statistical and economic impact. This result has been challenged by Stein and Daude 
(2001) who point out the high collinearity between their measure of corruption and GDP per 
capita, which can lead to spurious results when GDP per capita is not included in the equation. 
Using a wider range of institution variables, they nevertheless show inward FDI to be 
significantly influenced by the quality of institutions. More specifically, five out of six 
governance indicators provided by Kaufman et al. (1999) are shown to matter: Political instability 
and violence, government effectiveness, regulatory burden, rule of law and graft. Only the voice 
and accountability indicator appears to be a non significant determinant of FDI. Further 
regressions, using International Country Risk Guide and La Porta et al. (1998) indicators, show 
risk of repudiation of contracts by government, risk of expropriation and shareholder rights to 
matter. Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2005) also use the gravity specification to study the effect of 
institutional distance between the host and the source country on FDI. For instance, it is possible 
that corruption in the host country is less an impediment to FDI inflows when corruption is also 
quite high in the source country and investors are used to deal with it in the home country. More 
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generally, if institutions are dependent on economic and social history (including the colonisation 
era), then one could observe more FDI, other things equal, amongst countries displaying relatively 
similar institutions. Indeed, Globerman and Shapiro (2002) find that US multinationals are more 
likely to invest in countries whose legal systems are rooted in English Common Law. 
IV.2 The Empirical Relationship Between Bilateral FDI and Bilateral Aid Flows 
How does aid policy affect the investment policy on the matter of institutions? The matter 
is debated in the literature and essentially depends on the determinants of aid flows. As Alesina 
and Dollar (2000) and Alesina and Weder (2002) point out, there are various reasons why a rich 
country might send large amounts to a poor country. Those reasons range from pure altruistic 
poverty reducing motives, to more strategic, policy or economic oriented self-interests of the 
donor. The conditionality of aid, and its impact on institutions (and therefore indirectly on FDI) 
will depend on the motivation of aid. Less strategically motivated flows are likely to be more 
demanding in terms of transparency and effectiveness in the use of aid flows because the donor 
country does not expect a return from its gift in terms of external policy interests or higher 
exports. On the other extreme, aid motivated by political alliances might even delay needed 
institutional reforms by relaxing the budget constraint on governments choosing bad policies. 
The literature finds, as might be expected, that countries having few historic ties with 
developing countries, such as Nordic countries, are more influenced by income levels and the 
quality of institutions, such as democracy or low levels of corruption in the distribution pattern 
of their funds. On the other hand, it is found that countries like France, Great Britain or Belgium 
predominantly favoured ex-colonies and political allies (together with Japan), without much 
regard to the politico-economic conditions of the country receiving funds in the period 1970-94 
(Alesina and Dollar, 2000). Berthélemy (2005) also shows, with improved econometric tools, that 
self-interest of the donor is very frequent in aid allocation, and identifies Australia, France, Italy 
and the United Kingdom as particularly self-motivated. Alesina and Weder (2002) also found 
that less corrupt governments did not receive more aid (although there is some variation among 
donors) and that an increase in aid has the tendency to increase levels of perceived corruption in 
the receiving country, although they recognise causality issues in their procedure. This result has 
been since then challenged by Tavares (2003). He tries to estimate the impact of received aid on 
the level of corruption measured in the country by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 
index. In order to sort out causality, he takes advantage of the “proximity bias” in aid allocation 
by donors, which favour countries with historical linkages and geographical proximity over 
countries with most urgent needs or best behaviour. An index of proximity is then constructed 
(and used as an instrument for received aid) out of those proximity dimensions with donors, 
which is convincingly unaffected by changes in institutions and particularly in corruption. 
Received aid is robustly associated with less corruption, which is encouraging when confronted 
with the results mentioned above about the quite strong negative association between bad 
institutions (among them high corruption) and FDI received. Alesina and Weder (2002) find 
further positive results on democratisation. It seems to be a robust finding that democratizing 
countries can expect a substantial increase in the amount of aid received. However Burnside and 
Dollar (2000) have shown that the probability of adopting “good policies” was not affected by 
the amount of aid received. 
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I use in the next section bilateral OECD aid data to study how the different types of aid flows 
going to poor countries affect received FDI amounts. Determinants of those flows have been rarely 
studied at the bilateral level, and it is important to check whether those different types of aid flows 
have reasonable and expected determinants. Table 1 presents results of simple regressions explaining 
bilateral flows of aid (between 1973 and 1996) with determinants traditionally adopted in the 
literature. There are three sets of variables. The first one relates to economic conditions in the 
recipient and donor countries. The second set of variables account for various dimensions of the 
intensity of historical and cultural proximity between countries that can promote large aid flows. The 
third set of variables uses political science datasets to account for political events. The first column 
explains total bilateral aid, while the next ones detail results according to the type of aid flow4.  
Most findings already in the literature are confirmed at the detailed level, in particular 
the nonlinear inverted-U relationship concerning the relationship between GDP per cap of the 
receiving country and aid flows. As in Chauvet (2002), the turning point of the relationship is 
extremely low, which confirms that aid is essentially negatively related to income per capita. A 
lot of interesting new results emerge when detailing across aid motives. Spatial proximity and 
colonial relationships are crucial in all aid motives except emergency. UN vote correlation 
seems key in economic related aid flows like economic infrastructure of debt relief. 
Democratisation mostly helps receive socially oriented aid funds. 
Concerning the direct relation between aid and FDI, the empirical literature is scarce. 
Alesina and Dollar (2000) have concluded that poor countries “cannot expect much in the way of 
private flows”, based on the finding that FDI and aid have different determinants. This result 
however does not imply that a rise in aid received is unable to improve conditions for successful 
FDI. Furthermore, the literature does not really use the bilateral dimension of the data, by 
focussing on total aid received or sent by each country. Last, aid has different forms, depending 
on its final sector of utilisation. Aid designed for improving infrastructures or production 
conditions might not have the same effect as emergency assistance. 
A simple exercise assessing the effect of bilateral aid on bilateral FDI depending on the 
sector receiving aid is therefore simply missing in the literature, and I provide below a first pass 
at such an exercise. 
IV.3 An Application 
The first empirical statement that can be made on the relationship between aid and direct 
investment is one of apparent substitutability. UNCTAD (2004, pp.4-5) writes that “FDI Inflows 
accounted for 72 per cent of all resource flows to developing countries, six times higher than official flows. 
This contrasts with the latter half of the 1980s and the early 1990s, when official flows and FDI flows were 
almost the same, and with the mid-1990s, when portfolio flows and FDI flows were roughly equal. FDI is 
therefore recognised in the Monterrey Consensus as an important source of financing for development”.  
                                                     
4. Details on all data used in the paper are given in the data appendix. Table A-3 in the appendix presents 
results using a larger dataset, without use of political variables, which reduce the size of the sample 
somehow. Results are very comparable, and again comparable to the existing literature. 
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Table 1. Determinants of Bilateral Aid (with Institutions) 
Model: 
Dep. variable: 
(1) 
Total aid 
(2) 
Inf . aid 
(3) 
Soc. aid 
(4) 
Prod. aid 
(5) 
Debt aid 
(6) 
Mult.aid 
(7) 
Pr. .aid 
(8) 
Em. aid 
Intercept -34.30a 
(1.95) 
-28.03a 
(3.00) 
-26.84a 
(1.91) 
-26.09a 
(2.08) 
-0.25 
(5.28) 
-15.73a 
(2.84) 
-27.39a 
(2.85) 
-3.67 
(2.38) 
ln GDP/cap. rec. 
country 
1.07a 
(0.33) 
2.26a 
(0.53) 
0.91a 
(0.33) 
0.83b 
(0.35) 
-0.54 
(0.89) 
0.19 
(0.40) 
0.46 
(0.59) 
-1.46a 
(0.50) 
ln GDP/cap. sq., 
rec. ctry. 
-0.10a 
(0.02) 
-0.18a 
(0.04) 
-0.08a 
(0.02) 
-0.07a 
(0.03) 
0.04 
(0.07) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
-0.04 
(0.05) 
0.10b 
(0.04) 
ln pop. rec. 
country 
0.43a 
(0.03) 
0.38a 
(0.04) 
0.30a 
(0.03) 
0.33a 
(0.03) 
0.38a 
(0.06) 
0.23a 
(0.03) 
0.40a 
(0.04) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
ln GDP/cap  
donor ctry. 
1.39a 
(0.14) 
0.42b 
(0.19) 
1.13a 
(0.14) 
1.00a 
(0.15) 
-0.18 
(0.38) 
0.52b 
(0.21) 
1.09a 
(0.22) 
0.58a 
(0.21) 
ln GDP 
donor ctry. 
0.65a 
(0.04) 
0.56 a 
(0.05) 
0.48a 
(0.03) 
0.50a 
(0.04) 
0.02 
(0.07) 
0.37a 
(0.04) 
0.43a 
(0.05) 
0.07a 
(0.04) 
ln distance  -0.39a 
(0.06) 
-0.28a 
(0.07) 
-0.26a 
(0.06) 
-0.29a 
(0.06) 
-0.40b 
(0.17) 
-0.23a 
(0.09) 
-0.33a 
(0.09) 
-0.03 
(0.07) 
Common language 0.30a 
(0.09) 
-0.34a 
(0.11) 
0.08 
(0.08) 
-0.09 
(0.08) 
0.37 
(0.23) 
-0.28a 
(0.09) 
0.22b 
(0.11) 
-0.04 
(0.13) 
Contiguity -0.42c 
(0.23) 
-1.01 
0.97 
-1.73b 
(0.73) 
-0.30 
(0.52) 
-0.60 
(0.52) 
-0.99a 
(0.19) 
-0.05 
(0.24) 
0.73c 
(0.38) 
Pair ever in 
colonial rel. 
1.08a 
(0.12) 
0.83a 
(0.11) 
0.98a 
(0.11) 
0.59a 
(0.12) 
0.14 
(0.25) 
0.84a 
(0.12) 
0.62a 
(0.19) 
-0.20 
(0.15) 
UN vote 
correlation 
0.60a 
(0.15) 
1.04a 
(0.20) 
0.10 
(0.14) 
0.37a 
(0.13) 
2.14a 
(0.38) 
0.27 
(0.20) 
-0.19 
(0.19) 
-0.54c 
(0.32) 
USA-Egypt 
dummy 
3.53a 
(0.12) 
2.70a 
(0.15) 
3.05a 
(0.10) 
1.88a 
(0.10) 
2.83a 
(0.30) 
2.00a 
(0.13) 
3.35a 
(0.15) 
0.00a 
(0.00) 
USA-Israel 
dummy 
4.42a 
(0.23) 
7.13a 
(0.40) 
4.49a 
(0.23) 
0.00a 
(0.00) 
-2.88a 
(0.48) 
2.39a 
(0.27) 
4.40a 
(0.37) 
5.01a 
(0.46) 
War 0.08c 
(0.05) 
0.07 
(0.07) 
0.07 
(0.05) 
0.06 
(0.05) 
-0.02 
(0.11) 
0.03 
(0.07) 
0.10c 
(0.06) 
0.21a 
(0.07) 
Civil war -0.23a 
(0.08) 
-0.20 
(0.14) 
-0.01 
(0.09) 
0.02 
(0.11) 
-0.12 
(0.20) 
0.09 
(0.12) 
-0.13 
(0.10) 
-0.09 
(0.13) 
War t-1 0.09c 
(0.05) 
-0.03 
(0.06) 
0.15a 
(0.05) 
0.06 
(0.05) 
-0.02 
(0.11) 
0.01 
(0.07) 
0.02 
(0.06) 
0.21a 
(0.07) 
Civil war t-1 0.27a 
(0.08) 
0.17 
(0.13) 
0.15 
(0.09) 
0.06 
(0.11) 
0.09 
(0.22) 
0.02 
(0.12) 
0.29a 
(0.10) 
0.45a 
(0.13) 
Democracy index -0.07 
(0.14) 
0.09 
(0.23) 
0.07 
(0.17) 
0.26 
(0.17) 
-0.07 
(0.38) 
0.14 
(0.21) 
-0.07 
(0.19) 
0.25 
(0.24) 
Democracy index 
t-1 
0.42a 
(0.14) 
0.23 
(0.24) 
0.27c 
(0.16) 
-0.26 
(0.16) 
0.24 
(0.39) 
-0.13 
(0.21) 
0.59a 
(0.19) 
-0.46b 
(0.23) 
N 13 215 5 330 8 285 6 958 1 547 3 674 5 726 2 653 
R2 0.323 0.27 0.254 0.267 0.249 0.197 0.287 0.14 
RMSE 1.671 1.698 1.544 1.487 1.719 1.468 1.524 1.359 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses with a, b and c denoting significance at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent and 10 per cent levels 
respectively. The dependent variable are described as follows: Total aid = ln total bilateral aid; Inf. aid = ln bilateral economic 
infrastructure aid; Soc. Aid = ln bilateral aid for social infrastructure; Prod. Aid = ln bilateral aid for production sectors; Debt 
aid = ln bilateral debt relief; Mult aid = ln bilateral multisector aid; Pr. aid = ln bilateral programme assistance aid; and Em. 
Aid = ln bilateral emergency aid. See the Data Appendix for further description of both the dependent and independent 
variables. 
Source: See the Data Appendix for a full description of data sources. 
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Figure 2. Inward FDI and Aid Committed to the Sample of Developing Countries 
 
Our sample confirms those statements, as appears in Figure 2 plotting the evolution of the 
FDI and aid flows variables used in our regressions. While the two types of flows are relatively 
comparable at the start of the sample, there is a massive divergence around the start of the 
nineties, with falling aid flows, and rapidly expanding FDI inflows for our sample of developing 
countries. When looking at the geographical distribution of FDI and aid flows in our sample, 
sharp contrasts again emerge. Figures 3 and 4, report FDI and aid flows by geographical region 
at the beginning and at the end of the time span covered in our regressions. Countries in 
America and in Eastern Asia receive a very large share of FDI, while Southern Asia performs 
very poorly in terms of private investment, compared to its population size, while receiving large 
amounts of aid naturally due to low GDP per capita of countries in the region and notably India. 
The debate about the effect of regional policy subsidies on the location of activities can be 
usefully brought back here. After all, poor countries need aid because they are unable to generate 
economic conditions that attract sufficient amounts of investment, whether domestic or foreign. 
Low levels of profitability for investors in a certain host country, brings simultaneously low 
levels of income per capita, and relatively large amounts of aid. It is however possible that an 
exogenous increase in the amount of aid received, holding development level constant, can help 
attract FDI. One therefore critically needs to control for the level of development of the receiving 
country. Also it is important to detail which type of aid is received in order to assess whether 
certain types of project are more effective than others to generate private flows of investment. 
I use the gravity model of bilateral FDI, detailed in equation 2 to study how received aid 
affects the amount of FDI hosted by the country. The dependent variable is the log of bilateral FDI 
flows, and comes from the OECD bilateral FDI dataset, where the data is available from 1980 to 2001. 
It should be noted that the North-South part of this dataset mostly concerns flows from OECD 
member countries to emerging countries, with very little data available concerning least developed 
countries. A crucial part of the exercise is to assess which elements of aid policies seem most effective 
in raising levels of FDI received. Table 2 presents results for overall aid received, Tables 3, 4 and 5 
detail results for aid falling under the economic infrastructure, social infrastructure and production 
sectors categories in the OECD data respectively. In each of those tables, I test several specifications, 
in order to assess the robustness of the various effects found. Also the amount of bilateral and total 
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received aid are distinguished each time, since bilateral aid and bilateral FDI can be correlated 
due to unobservable characteristics of the country dyad, without much causation involved. 
Figure 3. FDI and Aid by Region, Period One 
 
Source: See Data Appendix. 
Figure 4. FDI and Aid by Region, Period Two 
 
Source: See Data Appendix 
The basic gravity model driving FDI flows appear in column 1 of Table 2. It incorporates 
the GDPs and income per capita levels of the origin and destination countries. GDPs are 
proxying for the economic sizes of the two countries, while GDP per capita proxy for relative 
production costs. A democracy index is added in order to account for the impact of institutions 
which was suggested to be an important determinant in the empirical literature recently. The 
proxies for transaction costs incorporate bilateral distance, contiguity, common language, and a 
dummy for colonial relationship ever. The income variables come from the World Bank WDI 
dataset, while the transaction costs proxies come from the CEPII distances dataset, the 
democracy index comes from POLITY IV, all regressions include year fixed effects (more detail 
available in the data appendix). Column 1 shows pooled results over the whole available country 
pairs, and column 2 restricts the sample to observations where bilateral aid data is non missing, 
that is for North-South observations. The global fit of the simple gravity framework in FDI 
regressions is almost as good as for trade volumes. All coefficients have usual and expected signs 
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and magnitudes, except for GDP per capita of the receiving country, which is expected to enter 
negatively as a proxy for production costs. The positive sign is both a sign of the imperfection of 
the proxy and of the already mentioned results above that production costs seem to matter much 
less than market access motives in FDI location. Note that market access suggested in the first 
section of the paper is also imperfectly proxied by the income of the host country. However each 
of the tables ends with a specification incorporating country-pair fixed effects, which will capture 
a lot of those market access and production costs determinants more precisely, together with all 
fixed determinants of the historical and cultural links between countries that might simultaneously 
affect bilateral FDI and bilateral aid. Also, it is noticeable that the democracy index has an 
important and positive influence in the whole sample but looses it in the North-South sample. The 
impact of this institutional aspects seem to be more important in distinguishing rich economies 
from less affluent ones, than as a determinant of choice between poor countries. 
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2 include the two aid variables, columns 5 and 6 lag them (with 
different time lags depending on the expected time lapse between the year of aid received and its 
effects), while columns 7 and 8 include a country pair fixed effects and therefore forces all the 
influence of different variables to come from the within variation5. In terms of global aid, only 
the bilateral flows seem at first sight to have some impact on bilateral FDI. From column 3, we 
learn that a 10 per cent increase in bilateral aid received increases hosted FDI from the same 
country by 1.5 per cent. This might seem modest, but in reality, the variance of the aid variable in 
our sample is considerable. A one standard deviation in bilateral aid amounts to a 460 per cent 
increase in the average bilateral aid flow! Such a one s.d. deviation does then bring almost a 70 per 
cent increase in received bilateral FDI. It is interesting to note that when one controls for internal or 
external conflicts in the country (wars and civil wars dummies), total aid received achieves 
statistical significance at the 5 per cent level. Total aid received will normally increase during an 
armed conflict, while FDI will decrease (by 60 per cent for a civil war). Omitting those variables 
renders the independent impact of received total aid insignificant, while it is in reality positive. 
Its effect does not survive the lagging in columns 5 and 6 though, while bilateral aid received 
does. The last step to investigate the robustness of the bilateral aid effect involves controlling for 
unobserved characteristics of the country pair that can explain a simultaneously high level of aid 
and FDI. The last two columns suggest that those are indeed crucial in the effect, since the 
magnitude and the significance of the aid impacts drop dramatically in those specifications. This 
offers a much less optimistic picture than the preceding columns, although it must be noted, that 
the time dimension of the data is probably the one where the availability of the data is the most 
problematic. Faced with those disappointing results on the time dimension relationship, we 
proceed to detailed types of aid, to investigate whether there are more robust results to be 
expected there. 
                                                     
5. Those fixed effects will therefore account for any omitted variable constant over time that might explain 
the correlation between bilateral aid and FDI in the cross-sectional dimension. Concerning time-varying 
omitted variables, note that if a shock occurs, often it will affect FDI and aid in opposite direction, like 
civil wars for instance. I try to control for some covariates that can have an influence in the same 
direction, like the democracy index for instance. While a case can be made for reverse causality, my 
regressions lag aid, making it hard to see how an increase in FDI could trigger aid flows in the past. 
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Table 2. The Influence of Aid on Bilateral FDI 
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Dependent variable: ln total bilateral FDI 
Intercept 49.37a 
(0.49) 
49.47a 
(1.83) 
43.21a 
(2.02) 
45.06a 
(2.44) 
43.15a 
(2.30) 
47.54a 
(2.58) 
53.33 
(52.13) 
198.7a 
(65.00) 
ln donor GDP 0.99a 
(0.01) 
0.98a 
(0.03) 
0.84a 
(0.04) 
0.98a 
(0.05) 
0.88a 
(0.04) 
0.99a 
(0.05) 
0.72 
(2.65) 
-5.99c 
(3.25) 
ln recipient GDP 0.76a 
(0.01) 
0.77a 
(0.04) 
0.70a 
(0.04) 
0.71a 
(0.05) 
0.68a 
(0.05) 
0.73a 
(0.05) 
-3.63a 
(1.18) 
-5.24a 
(1.63) 
ln recip. GDP/cap 0.13a 
(0.02) 
0.36a 
(0.04) 
0.47a 
(0.05) 
0.37a 
(0.06) 
0.45a 
(0.06) 
0.36a 
(0.06) 
4.21a 
(1.17) 
5.75a 
(1.60) 
ln donor GDP/cap  1.09a 
(0.02) 
0.76b 
(0.15) 
0.51a 
(0.16) 
0.37c 
(0.19) 
0.47b 
(0.18) 
0.53a 
(0.21) 
-1.01 
(2.60) 
5.87c 
(3.14) 
ln distance - 0.64a 
(0.02) 
-0.29a 
(0.05) 
-0.23a 
(0.05) 
-0.23a 
(0.06) 
-0.23a 
(0.06) 
-0.25a 
(0.06) 
  
Common language 1.58a 
(0.06) 
0.53a 
(0.18) 
0.39b 
(0.18) 
0.32 
(0.23) 
0.45b 
(0.21) 
0.19 
(0.24) 
  
Contiguity 0.06 
(0.08) 
0.76a 
(0.29) 
0.85a 
(0.28) 
0.78b 
(0.37) 
1.00a 
(0.31) 
0.80b 
(0.37) 
  
Pair ever in colonial 
relationship 
0.86a 
(0.08) 
1.29a 
(0.18) 
1.15a 
(0.18) 
0.99a 
(0.22) 
1.16a 
(0.20) 
1.13a 
(0.23) 
  
Democracy index 0.28a 
(0.09) 
-0.04 
(0.14) 
0.01 
(0.14) 
0.16 
(0.16) 
    
ln total aid received   0.00 
(0.03) 
0.08b 
(0.04) 
    
ln total bilateral aid   0.15a 
(0.02) 
0.12a 
(0.03) 
    
War    -0.49a 
(0.10) 
    
Civil War    -0.93a 
(0.20) 
    
ln total aid received, 
t-1 
    -0.03 
(0.04) 
0.04 
(0.04) 
0.06 
(0.04) 
0.03 
(0.05) 
ln total bilateral aid, 
t-1 
    0.15a 
(0.02) 
0.14a 
(0.03) 
0.00 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
Democracy index     -0.06 
(0.16) 
0.11 
(0.17) 
-0.48c 
(0.28) 
-0.39 
(0.31) 
War t-1      -0.64a 
(0.11) 
 -0.06 
(0.10) 
Civil War t-1      -0.85a 
(0.20) 
 -0.57a 
(0.18) 
Year fixed effects  
Cntry. Pair fixed eff. 
YES 
NO 
YES 
NO 
YES 
NO 
YES 
NO 
YES 
NO 
YES 
NO 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
N 17 704 2 995 2 995 1 996 2 327 1 737 2 327 1 737 
R2 0.586 0.376 0.387 0.407 0.397 0.44 0.286 0.299 
RMSE 0.116 0.028 0.01 1.955 1.967 1.883 1.24 1.161 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. The superscripts a, b and c denote significance at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent and 10 per cent 
levels respectively. 
Source: See Data Appendix.  
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Table 3 provides results concerning aid related to “economic infrastructure”. This 
heading is one of the most important candidates for our purposes, since it “covers assistance 
for networks, utilities and services that facilitate economic activity”, notably “equipment or 
infrastructure for road, rail, water and air transport, and for television, radio and electronic 
information networks”. Those infrastructures are supposed to help attract FDI both because it 
enhances the market access of the countries, and therefore the export potential of affiliates 
located here, and because it is likely to reduce production costs. Column 1 gives baseline 
results without any aid-related variables, and the following columns proceed as in Table 2: 
First including aid variables, then adding conflictuality of the receiving country in columns 2 
and 3. The next two columns lag two years the aid variables. The last two include dyad fixed 
effects. Total economic infrastructure aid received is strongly associated with additional 
attractiveness of foreign capital. In column 4, the coefficient of 0.27 associated with a coefficient 
of variation of 2.69 for this variable means that a one standard deviation increase in this type of 
aid increase FDI received by almost 100 per cent. Note also that here only the total amount of 
aid received has an attractive effect, which seems quite reasonable, and suggests that the effect 
is less due to omitted pair-specific characteristics. However, this very strong effect seems 
entirely caused by the cross-sectional variation in the data here again, as can bee seen in the 
last two columns. This behaviour of coefficients holds for social infrastructure aid flows, which 
mainly involves funding of projects that are education, health or sanitary-related. Bilateral aid 
flows of this sort is positively associated with FDI flows, until dyad specific fixed effects are 
included, in the last two columns of Table 4. Only the flows of aid directly given to specific 
production sectors seem to differ in patterns. First, both bilateral and total aid is significant and 
positive. Second, total received aid of this type keeps some significance after the inclusion of 
fixed effects. 
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Table 3. The Influence of Economic Infrastructure Aid on Bilateral FDI 
Model: (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Dependent variable: ln total bilateral FDI 
Intercept -39.15a 
(2.37) 
-39.21a 
(2.54) 
-45.45a 
(3.05) 
-35.87a 
(3.19) 
-44.32a 
(3.53) 
40.41a 
(102.42) 
77.90 
(119.02) 
ln donor GDP 0.92a 
(0.05) 
0.89a 
(0.05) 
1.09a 
(0.07) 
0.84a 
(0.07) 
1.06a 
(0.08) 
0.94 
(5.21) 
-1.64 
(5.91) 
ln recipient GDP 0.81a 
(0.05) 
0.75a 
(0.05) 
0.77a 
(0.07) 
0.64a 
(0.06) 
0.71a 
(0.08) 
-3.04 
(2.10) 
-3.11 
(2.83) 
ln recipient GDP/cap 0.44a 
(0.06) 
0.71a 
(0.08) 
0.68a 
(0.10) 
0.67a 
(0.09) 
0.52a 
(0.10) 
3.67c 
(2.06) 
3.84 
(2.80) 
ln donor GDP/cap -0.18 
(0.23) 
-0.23 
(0.23) 
-0.04 
(0.27) 
-0.12 
(0.29) 
0.23 
(0.32) 
-1.11 
(5.05) 
2.21 
(5.66) 
ln distance - 0.36a 
(0.06) 
-0.39a 
(0.07) 
-0.50a 
(0.08) 
-0.35a 
(0.08) 
-0.53a 
(0.09) 
  
Common language 0.41c 
(0.21) 
0.41c 
(0.21) 
0.56b 
(0.26) 
0.57b 
(0.27) 
0.71b 
(0.31) 
  
Contiguity 0.41 
(0.41) 
0.41 
(0.41) 
0.83 
(0.63) 
0.22 
(0.53) 
0.57 
(0.70) 
  
Pair ever in colonial relationship 0.91a 
(0.21) 
0.89a 
(0.21) 
0.72a 
(0.26) 
0.79a 
(0.25) 
0.65b 
(0.30) 
  
Democracy index -0.24 
(0.17) 
-0.07 
(0.17) 
0.07 
(0.21) 
    
ln economic infrastr. aid 
received 
 0.16a 
(0.04) 
0.27a 
(0.05) 
    
ln bilateral infrastr. aid  0.04 
(0.03) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
    
War   -0.60a 
(0.15) 
    
Civil War   -0.89a 
(0.22) 
    
ln econ. infrastr. aid received, t-2    0.15a 
(0.05) 
0.22a 
(0.06) 
0.03 
(0.05) 
0.02 
(0.06) 
ln econ. infrastr. bilateral aid, t-2    0.01 
(0.03) 
0.01 
(0.04) 
-0.05 
(0.03) 
-0.03 
(0.03) 
Democracy index. t-1    -0.33 
(0.21) 
-0.12 
(0.24) 
-0.86c 
(0.47) 
-0.85 
(0.57) 
War, t-1     -0.76a 
(0.17) 
 -0.18 
(0.15) 
Civil War, t-1     -1.11a 
(0.25) 
 -0.91a 
(0.24) 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Ctry pair fixed eff. NO NO NO NO NO YES YES 
N 1 349 1 349 886 861 623 861 623 
R2 0.399 0.412 0.453 0.369 0.471 0.335 0.401 
RMSE 1.753 1.736 1.692 1.649 1.557 1.051 0.966 
Note:  Standard errors are in parentheses. The superscripts a, b and c denote significance at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent and 10 per cent 
levels respectively.  
Source: See Data Appendix. 
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V. HOW TRADE AND FDI POLICIES INTERACT 
V.1 Trade Liberalisation and Inward FDI 
The interaction between trade and FDI policies revolves around the idea mentioned 
above that improving the market access of developing countries could be one of the important 
ways to accelerate FDI inflows into those countries attracted by new export possibilities to rich 
countries. While this idea is not in itself really new, the recently developed field of New 
Economic Geography has clarified and formalised it rigorously and made this mechanism the 
key mechanism behind successful development strategies. Redding and Venables (2004) 
surveyed above provides a rather convincing argument that increases in market access is very 
strongly associated with higher income per capita, through a higher profitability of the host 
country and subsequent attractiveness to investors (confirmed by Head and Mayer, 2004).  
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Table 4. The Influence of Social Infrastructure Aid on Bilateral FDI 
Model: (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Dependent variable: ln total bilateral FDI 
Intercept -48.52a 
(2.13) 
-40.14a 
(2.37) 
-43.52a 
(2.99) 
-37.73a 
(3.09) 
-46.76a 
(3.67) 
80.63 
(81.24) 
267.93a 
(101.07) 
ln donor GDP 1.09a 
(0.04) 
0.93a 
(0.04) 
1.13a 
(0.06) 
0.99a 
(0.05) 
1.17a 
(0.06) 
0.90 
(4.16) 
-8.64c 
(5.08) 
ln recipient GDP 0.82a 
(0.05) 
0.75a 
(0.05) 
0.78a 
(0.06) 
0.73a 
(0.06) 
0.81a 
(0.07) 
-5.72a 
(1.75) 
-6.82a 
(2.41) 
ln recipient GDP/cap 0.32a 
(0.05) 
0.38a 
(0.06) 
0.25a 
(0.07) 
0.32a 
(0.07) 
0.19b 
(0.08) 
6.17a 
(1.73) 
7.00a 
(2.38) 
ln donor GDP/cap 0.36b 
(0.18) 
0.01 
(0.19) 
-0.10 
(0.24) 
-0.29 
(0.25) 
0.07 
(0.31) 
-0.75 
(4.08) 
9.21c 
(4.88) 
ln distance - 0.42a 
(0.06) 
-0.33a 
(0.06) 
-0.39a 
(0.07) 
-0.32a 
(0.07) 
-0.40a 
(0.08) 
  
Common language 0.61a 
(0.22) 
0.49b 
(0.21) 
0.36 
(0.28) 
0.47c 
(0.28) 
0.23 
(0.35) 
  
Contiguity 0.61c 
(0.34) 
0.87a 
(0.34) 
0.74 
(0.47) 
0.93b 
(0.41) 
0.49 
(0.52) 
  
Pair ever in colonial relationship 1.26a 
(0.21) 
0.98a 
(0.21) 
0.86a 
(0.27) 
1.08a 
(0.26) 
0.12a 
(0.31) 
  
Democracy index -0.07 
(0.16) 
-0.01 
(0.16) 
0.15 
(0.19) 
    
ln social infrastr. aid received  -0.06 
(0.04) 
0.04 
(0.05) 
    
ln social infrastr. bilateral aid  0.21a 
(0.03) 
0.16a 
(0.03) 
    
War   -0.53a 
(0.13) 
    
Civil War   -1.00a 
(0.25) 
    
ln. social infrastr. aid rec., t-2    -0.15a 
(0.05) 
-0.08a 
(0.06) 
-0.02 
(0.05) 
0.03 
(0.05) 
ln social infrastr. bilateral aid, t-2    0.20a 
(0.03) 
0.15a 
(0.04) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.02 
(0.04) 
Democracy index, t-1    -0.09 
(0.20) 
0.04 
(0.23) 
-0.32 
(0.42) 
-0.28 
(0.46) 
War, t-1     -0.60a 
(0.15) 
 -0.01 
(0.14) 
Civil war. T-1     -1.05a 
(0.30) 
 -1.14a 
(0.29) 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country Pair FE NO NO NO NO NO YES YES 
N 2 264 2 264 1 390 1 399 948 1 399 948 
R2 0.399 0.414 0.444 0.412 0.46 0.208 0.261 
RMSE 2.019 1.994 1.947 1.93 1.861 1.195 1.08 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. The superscripts a, b and c denote significance at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent and 10 per cent 
levels respectively. 
Source: See Data Appendix.  
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Table 5.The Influence of Production Sector Aid on Bilateral FDI 
Model: (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Dependent variable: ln total bilateral FDI 
Intercept -40.36a 
(2.48) 
-37.51a 
(2.69) 
-39.89a 
(3.30) 
-36.71a 
(3.08) 
-41.96a 
(3.53) 
12.25 
(78.83) 
197.78b 
(93.05) 
ln donor GDP 1.01a 
(0.05) 
0.95a 
(0.05) 
1.13a 
(0.06) 
0.91a 
(0.06) 
1.09a 
(0.07) 
2.14 
(4.01) 
-5.83 
(4.73) 
ln recipient GDP 0.78a 
(0.05) 
0.68a 
(0.05) 
0.67a 
(0.07) 
0.66a 
(0.06) 
0.72a 
(0.07) 
-2.84c 
(1.65) 
-5.44b 
(2.18) 
ln recipient GDP/cap. 0.38a 
(0.06) 
0.69a 
(0.08) 
0.50a 
(0.10) 
0.67a 
(0.09) 
0.48a 
(0.10) 
3.40b 
(1.61) 
5.72a 
(2.13) 
ln donor GDP/cap. -0.30 
(0.22) 
-0.42c 
(0.22) 
-0.38 
(0.27) 
-0.35 
(0.26) 
-0.21 
(0.30) 
-2.16 
(3.91) 
6.26 
(4.55) 
ln distance - 0.27a 
(0.07) 
-0.34a 
(0.07) 
-0.46a 
(0.08) 
-0.32a 
(0.08) 
-0.39a 
(0.09) 
  
Common language 0.20 
(0.23) 
0.19 
(0.22) 
0.25 
(0.29) 
0.35 
(0.26) 
0.21 
(0.31) 
  
Contiguity 0.31 
(0.50) 
0.25 
(0.49) 
0.61 
(0.64) 
0.11 
(0.54) 
0.74 
(0.63) 
  
Pair ever in colonial rel. 1.16a 
(0.22) 
0.12a 
(0.22) 
0.77a 
(0.27) 
0.97a 
(0.24) 
0.77a 
(0.28) 
  
Democracy index -0.07 
(0.17) 
0.06 
(0.17) 
0.04 
(0.20) 
    
ln production aid received  0.21a 
(0.05) 
0.19a 
(0.06) 
    
ln bilateral production aid  0.09a 
(0.03) 
0.08b 
(0.04) 
    
War   -0.52a 
(0.14) 
    
Civil war   -0.87a 
(0.23) 
    
ln prodn. Aid received, t-1    0.19a 
(0.05) 
0.16a 
(0.06) 
0.10c 
(0.05) 
0.06 
(0.05) 
Ln bilateral prodn. Aid, t-1     0.09b 
(0.04) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
0.00 
(0.03) 
Democracy index, t-1     -0.01 
(0.21) 
-0.48 
(0.38) 
-0.68 
(0.43) 
War, t-1     -0.54a 
(0.15) 
 0.10 
(0.13) 
Civil war, t-1     -0.77a 
(0.25) 
 0.70a 
(0.22) 
Year Fixed Eff. YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Ctry. Pair FE NO NO NO NO NO YES YES 
N 1 486 1 486 971 1 158 845 1 158 845 
R2 0.393 0.41 0.449 0.384 0.437 0.289 0.316 
RMSE 1.851 1.826 1.777 1.793 1.744 1.118 1.012 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. The superscripts a, b and c denote significance at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent and 10 per cent 
levels respectively. 
Source: See Data Appendix  
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Several trade policy recommendations emerge from those NEG predictions and empirical 
results (Puga and Venables, 1999; Henderson et al, 2001, are examples of papers summarizing the 
arguments): 
 
• Trade facilitation between poor countries is quite likely to be an effective policy in terms of FDI 
attraction. This involves both transport cost reduction through infrastructure building or 
improvement, but also reductions in cost associated with bureaucratic or corruption burden imposed 
when crossing a border. Such a move improves the market potential of the whole region by 
increasing its “internal” demand perceived by firms (that is its size weighted by its accessibility). 
Although there might be issues concerning which particular countries benefit from this increased 
investment flows, those are likely to be sufficiently substantial to improve the economic situation of 
all of those. On the empirical side, Calderon and Serven (2004) show in a careful econometric analysis 
over the 1960-2000 period, that exogenous improvements in the level and quality of transport 
infrastructure plays a significant and large effect in boosting growth levels, and in reducing income 
inequality. 
• Temporary non reciprocal market access improvements granted by rich countries might make sense 
when economies of agglomeration are important, especially when increasing returns to scale are large 
and when progress on overall trade costs is hard or slow. Realistic models of economic geography 
modelling North-South trade integration show that the first best policy recommendation is to 
approach total free trade as quick and as much as possible, which generates a convergence 
mechanism between poor and rich economies. However, total and immediate trade costs abolition is 
simply impossible in most of the cases, if only because of incompressible transport costs. There is at 
the minimum a transition period, in which FDI might not be attracted by Southern countries (or 
might even flow in the “wrong” direction). Asymmetric opening up of “core” markets like what has 
been done during the transition period in Europe might well be a very reasonable step before the 
complete removal of formal trade barriers. 
Basically, the arguments states that an improvement in market access needed to attract 
FDI relies on improvement in transport infrastructure for South-South trade and more on 
traditional trade policies issues for North-South trade, which can be solved by more generous 
trade policies in the multilateral arena, or through North-South preferential regional trade 
arrangements. Under this logic, developing countries should try to sign preferential 
arrangements with large industrialised countries, rather than with poorer neighbours. This view 
stresses the importance of North-South agreements, which rejoin the conclusions of the 
traditional vinerian analysis, for which this kind of agreements reduces the importance of trade 
diversion. An important caveat is in order here: Market access improvements are often not 
unidirectional. Northern exporters might also gain better access to Southern markets in the 
process (which is usually the way to politically “sell” the agreement at home in the North). The 
final effect on FDI is then uncertain. Indeed, firms in rich countries might find it even more 
advantageous to stay located in the North, where they enjoy good access to the largest demand 
in the world as well as proximity to input producers, while it is easier after the regional 
agreement to serve the consumers of poor markets. 
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There are numerous empirical papers studying the impact of regional agreements on FDI 
inflows, which generally find reasonably large and positive effects. A recent paper by Clausing 
and Dorobantu (2005) studies an interesting example: the impact of future membership 
announcements on FDI received by various Eastern European countries during the transition 
period. Between 1992 and 2001, FDI stock soared in those countries from an average of 2 per cent 
of GDP to an average level of 40 per cent. Their regressions involve 28 host countries (both 
members, candidate countries, and non members), over the 1992-2001 period. EU membership in 
the regression increases substantially the amount of FDI received, and the most interesting 
results concerns announcements concerning negotiations on membership at various stages. The 
first announcement of the opening in negotiations in 1997 is associated with a doubling of FDI 
received, while the second announcements in 1997 about which countries would be part of the 
first or second wave of enlargement mostly benefited to second wave countries for which final 
membership was far more uncertain prior to the announcement. Changes in the prospects of 
market access of a given country therefore radically changes its attractiveness to foreign 
investors (a similar result was found in Bevan and Estrin, 2004). The following subsection tries to 
provide larger scale evidence. 
V.2 An Application 
In this section, I investigate how the improvement in the access to rich countries market 
helped developing countries to attract FDI. Several strategies are possible. First I follow what has 
been done in the literature and include dummy variables for participation in trade liberalizing 
institutions that is regional preferential trading arrangements, and GATT/WTO membership. 
Those two dummy variables help us study the potential impact of belonging to such institutions 
in FDI received, but they are certainly incomplete in specifying how developing countries in 
general have access to the wide markets of the rich world. GSP programmes or other types of 
preferential relationships are harder to measure on a consistent basis, but can possibly affect 
“real” export opportunities in a very substantial way. 
Another approach can be followed which estimates in a first step, the global ease of access 
of each developing country in our sample to rich countries' markets. This methodology estimates 
the impact of national borders on imports through a comparison of internal trade with imports 
from various sources (see Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004, for details on this methodology and 
how it relates to more traditional estimates of trade costs, and Mayer and Zignago, 2005, for an 
application to North-South trade flows). Therefore I estimate in a first step for a large number of 
developing countries the quality of access granted to their exporters by different rich countries 
for different periods of time: 1985-89, 1990-94, and 1995-2001.This is done by estimating border 
effects, which will therefore provide an estimate of various trade policy measures as well as 
other hindrances to exports to each rich country market. There is therefore both cross sectional 
and time series variance in this data, and we can see in Figure 5 that an easier access to rich 
countries' markets helps increase the ratio of received FDI as a percent of GDP.  
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Figure 5. Inward FDI and the Trade-impeding Effects of Rich Countries’ Borders 
 
Source: See Data Appendix. 
The horizontal axis in this graph represents border effects6; the vertical axis represents the 
average FDI/GDP ratio over the period (in logs). Each point therefore gives, for a given 
developing economy and period of time, the difficulty of access to rich countries' markets on the 
horizontal axis and how large is FDI in its GDP on the vertical one. When border effects are 
reduced, exports to rich countries are easier and FDI inflows increase as a percent of GDP. 
Proceeding to regression analysis, we can see in first column of Table 6 which takes the 
same data and gravity model benchmark as in the preceding section that regional agreements 
promote FDI, which confirms findings in the literature quoted above. What is more novel is the 
impact of GATT membership which also has a strong positive impact as can be seen in the 
second column (origin has less of an effect because almost all of them are members throughout 
the sample). Third column restricts the sample to North-South observations where border effect 
estimates, graphed in Figure 5 are available. As can be seen, the impact of regional agreements 
on FDI flows is mostly a North-North phenomenon. The two regional agreements kept in our 
sample at the stage of column 3 (NAFTA and the EU-Turkey customs union), do not increase FDI 
flows more than what the other gravity forces in the regression would predict. In column 4, 
border effects enter negatively as expected, while column 5 incorporates all three relevant 
determinants, and column 6 again includes dyadic fixed effects. In column 5, GATT/WTO 
membership appears to multiply FDI inflows by 3.6, while a one standard deviation in border 
effects, which represents a 20 per cent increase from the mean value, translates into a 2 per cent 
decrease in FDI inflows. Note that the estimate is larger when GATT membership is not in the 
equation, since the two are of course negatively correlated. GATT/WTO membership seems 
                                                     
6. The figures, when exponentiated, tell us how much more rich countries trade with themselves than 
with the considered country, holding the relative sizes, prices and distances of the trading economies 
constant. 
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therefore to have a much larger effect on received FDI, which is also reflected by the significant 
within effect in column 6, where membership for a given country raises its subsequent level of 
received FDI by 76 per cent. 
Table 6. The Influence of Market Access on Bilateral FDI 
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Dependent variable: ln total bilateral; FDI 
Intercept -48.92a 
(0.49) 
-49.62a 
(0.48) 
-46.81a 
(0.96) 
-45.89a 
(0.97) 
-47.35a 
(0.96) 
147.63a 
(17.43) 
ln donor GDP 0.97a 
(0.01) 
0.98a 
(0.01) 
1.03a 
(0.02) 
1.03a 
(0.02) 
1.04a 
(0.02) 
-1.67b 
(0.77) 
ln recipient GDP 0.74a 
(0.01) 
0.76a 
(0.01) 
0.61a 
(0.03) 
0.60a 
(0.03) 
0.66a 
(0.03) 
-6.72a 
(0.67) 
ln recipient GDP/cap 0.10a 
(0.02) 
0.05b 
(0.02) 
0.12a 
(0.04) 
0.11a 
(0.04) 
-0.01 
(0.04) 
6.42a 
(0.68) 
ln donor GDP/cap 1.07a 
(0.02) 
1.06a 
(0.02) 
0.92a 
(0.03) 
0.94a 
(0.03) 
0.95a 
(0.03) 
2.19a 
(0.80) 
ln distance - 0.55a 
(0.02) 
-0.60a 
(0.02) 
-0.51a 
(0.04) 
-0.45a 
(0.04) 
-0.57a 
(0.04) 
 
Common language 1.59a 
(0.06) 
1.55a 
(0.06) 
1.10a 
(0.15) 
1.21a 
(0.15) 
1.04a 
(0.15) 
 
Contiguity 0.05 
(0.08) 
0.03 
(0.08) 
0.69a 
(0.17) 
0.76a 
(0.17) 
0.72a (0.17)  
Pair ever in colonial relation 0.91a 
(0.08) 
0.89a 
(0.08) 
1.03a 
(0.16) 
1.05a 
(0.16) 
1.00a (0.15)  
Democracy index 0.24a 
(0.09) 
-0.33a 
(0.09) 
0.40a 
(0.13) 
0.70a 
(0.14) 
0.21 
(0.14) 
-0.05 
(0.20) 
Regional agreement 0.64a 
(0.06) 
0.55a 
(0.06) 
-0.31 (0.24) -0.48
b 
(0.24) 
-0.65a 
(0.23) 
0.34 
(0.22) 
Destination ctry. In GATT/WTO   1.45a 
(0.07) 
  1.28a 
(0.09) 
0.57a 
(0.14) 
Origin ctry. In GATT/WTO  0.15b 
(0.06) 
    
Border effect    -0.17a 
(0.02) 
-0.10a 
(0.02) 
-0.05a 
(0.05) 
Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country. Pair FE NO NO NO NO NO YES 
N 17 704 17 704 5 939 5 939 5 939 5 939 
R2 0.589 0.589 0.51 0.515 0.531 0.308 
RMSE 2.108 2.086 2.146 2.136 2.1 1.431 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. The superscripts a, b and c denote significance at the 1 per cent, 5 per 
cent and 10 per cent levels respectively.  
Source: See Data Appendix. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Assessing policy coherence from the point of view of policies trying to develop the flows 
of foreign investment going from rich to poor countries involves primarily an assessment of the 
factors influencing FDI attractiveness, and its effects on the host economy. It also consists on 
asking whether this objective is a sensible one, i.e. whether hosting more FDI actually helps the 
country grow faster or reduce poverty for instance. Finally the key questions asked is how aid 
and trade policies affect the amount of FDI received, and its impact on the country's 
development. I review the literature on FDI location choice, which stresses a trade-off between 
market access and production costs as a central determinant in the decision to build an affiliate 
abroad. In this trade-off, the empirical literature has clearly shown that access to markets has a 
dominant weight. Concerning the impact of FDI on economic growth or on the productivity of 
local firms, the empirical evidence starting with a very optimistic message stressing positive and 
strong impacts has become much more reserved with the development of better econometric 
methods using improved data. The importance of absorptive capacities, like local human capital, 
which can be improved by foreign aid, or of openness to trade, as channels of growth-enhancing 
FDI has also been quite drastically downsized by recent work. Our original empirical work, 
making use of bilateral aid and FDI flows from OECD datasets over the 1980-2001 period, shows 
that the impact of bilateral aid on foreign investment hosted, while positive, is entirely due to the 
unobserved fixed characteristics of the country-pair relationship, with no impact left of the 
impact of aid increases over time. Different trade policy and market access variables are also 
introduced as covariates of bilateral FDI, with more positive impacts, especially for GATT 
membership of the hosting economy. 
It is to be kept in mind that our empirical analysis only considers middle income host 
countries, because of lacking comparable data on the amount of FDI received in least developed 
country. A natural question is then to ask whether our results would hold for the rest of the 
developing world as well. When considering the persistent problems encountered by lowest 
income countries in attracting FDI combined with the fact that those countries receive a 
disproportionate share of emergency aid (unlikely to directly improve in a drastic way the 
attractiveness of the country for foreign investors), it seems unlikely that the impact of aid would 
be drastically more positive for those countries. However, answering rigorously the question 
would require new data, for instance studying the location choices of foreign investors from a 
single major OECD country in the whole set of developing countries across time.6 An alternative 
would be to look at the interaction between how aid is spent and FDI inside one of those poor 
                                                     
6. The data exists to have this type of analysis carried out for the Japanese, French or American FDI for instance, who 
are both large investors abroad and large aid donators. 
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countries that are not in the OECD data used here. This might be one aspect where country case 
studies can bring new and interesting insights that cross-country panel data cannot offer. Indeed, 
the type of data available for cross-country regressions is necessarily incomplete and imperfect. 
Data on precise projects developed through foreign aid should be used to identify precise 
areas/industries that benefited from a development of economic infrastructure for instance, or 
from the level of education among the local population. Ideally this information could be 
coupled with firm-level data on FDI to investigate which type of project attract foreign investors, 
and whether some type of project make the impact of FDI on the local set of firms more positive. 
For instance, it has been argued that the positive impact of FDI on local firms take the form of 
technological spillovers through labour force turnover or voluntary knowledge transfers by 
multinational firms to their suppliers. Improvement in communication infrastructures or in the 
skill level of local workers could enhance those channels and detailed data could help us better 
understand those important potential FDI-related benefits of foreign aid policy. 
 
 OECD Development Centre Working Paper No. 253 
 
DEV/DOC(2006)07 
 45© OECD 2006 
 
DATA APPENDIX 
• The main dependent variable used in the paper is the log of bilateral FDI flows. The source is the 
electronic edition of the OECD's International Direct Investment Statistics Yearbook, latest edition, where 
the data are available from 1980 to 2001. Table A-1 lists countries that receive both FDI and aid in the 
sample, together with their first and last years of appearance in the sample and the number of 
potential observations. 
• Aid flow data are taken from OECD's annual publication entitled Geographical Distribution of Financial 
Flows to Aid Recipients. This publication offers the important advantage of distinguishing between 
different purposes of aid flows. Among them are: 
Social Infrastructure and Services, including notably educational infrastructure, services and 
investment, assistance to hospitals and clinics and all assistance given for water supply, use and sanitation. 
Economic Infrastructure and Services includes aid towards production and distribution of 
energy, plus equipment or infrastructure for road, rail, water and air transport, and for 
television, radio and electronic information networks. 
Production Sectors, which groups contributions to all directly productive sectors. 
Multisector aid is support for projects that straddle several sectors, with a concentration 
on the environment, gender projects and urban and rural development. 
Programme Assistance covers all general developmental contributions (other than debt 
reorganisation) made available with no pre-imposed sector allocation. 
Action Relating to Debt includes debt forgiveness, rescheduling, refinancing, etc. 
Emergency Assistance is emergency and distress relief in cash or in kind, including food 
relief and aid to refugees. 
• The counterpart to this quality of detail is that the flows represent commitments rather than actual 
disbursements, with a potentially large difference between the two in some cases. Note, however, that 
they seem to behave very similarly to disbursements; the results in Table 1 are comparable to those 
usually found in the literature (see Alesina and Dollar, 2000, or Chauvet,, 2002, for instance). 
Moreover, commitments can have a large signalling role for foreign investors, who can be affected by 
them even if not all commitments actually end up in disbursements. 
• GDP and income per capita come from the World Bank WDI data set. 
• Bilateral distance, contiguity, common language, and the dummy for colonial relationship come from 
the distances data set made available by CEPII at http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm. 
• The democracy index comes from the POLITY IV project, http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/. 
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• The data on international and internal conflicts all come from the correlates of war project, which 
collects very large amounts of data that can play a role in the emergence of conflicts between and 
within states, http://cow2.la.psu.edu/. The period covered by interstate wars is 1816–2001, while that 
for civil wars spans from 1816 to 1997. 
• The “UN votes” correlation variable is based on roll-call votes. This form of vote occurs when one 
Member State requests the recording of the vote so that its stand on an issue or the stands of others 
can be clearly identified. Recording must be requested before the voting starts. This annual database 
created by Gartzke et al. (1999) covers 1946–1996. 
Table A-1. Countries Receiving FDI and Aid in the Sample 
Country ISO First Year Last Year No. Potential Obs. 
ANT 
ARE 
ARG 
BGR 
BRA 
CHL 
CHN 
COL 
CRI 
CZE 
DZA 
EGY 
HKG 
HUN 
IDN 
IND 
IRN 
ISL 
ISR 
KOR 
KWT 
LBY 
MAR 
MEX 
MYS 
PAN 
PHL 
POL 
ROM 
RUS 
SAU 
SGP 
SVK 
SVN 
THA 
TUR 
TWN 
UKR 
VEN 
ZAF 
1983 
1983 
1980 
1982 
1980 
1980 
1980 
1983 
1983 
1980 
1983 
1982 
1980 
1982 
1980 
1980 
1983 
1981 
1982 
1980 
1983 
1983 
1983 
1980 
1980 
1983 
1980 
1982 
1982 
1980 
1982 
1980 
1980 
1988 
1980 
1980 
1980 
1980 
1983 
1982 
1997 
2000 
2001 
2001 
2001 
2001 
2001 
2001 
1998 
2001 
1998 
2001 
2001 
2001 
2001 
2001 
2001 
2001 
2001 
2001 
1998 
1997 
2001 
2001 
2001 
2000 
2001 
2001 
2001 
2001 
1998 
2001 
2001 
2001 
2001 
2001 
2001 
2001 
2001 
2001 
24 
31 
199 
135 
205 
189 
199 
105 
21 
392 
21 
130 
190 
210 
173 
196 
87 
201 
149 
351 
11 
17 
106 
354 
185 
26 
186 
239 
139 
387 
51 
203 
358 
131 
193 
222 
175 
337 
111 
141 
Total 1980 2001 6 780 
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Table A–2. Descriptive Statistics of Variables Used in the Sample 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev  Min Max 
FDI flows (million $) 
GDP/cap ($) 
Total aid (million $) 
Social infr. bilat. aid 
Econ. infr. bilat. aid 
Prod. bilat. Aid 
Multisector bilat. aid 
Assistance bilat. aid 
Debt relief bilat. aid 
Emergency bilat. aid 
Democracy index 
War in destination ctry. 
Civil war in dest. ctry. 
Common language 
Colony 
Border effect 
GATT member  
6 579 
5 603 
3 347 
2 511 
1 545 
1 690 
886 
538 
179 
983 
5 843 
5 814 
5 056 
6 579 
6 579 
4 357 
6 579 
136.9168 
4443.771 
67.95255 
18.33349 
52.02887 
17.63077 
11.73657 
67.48271 
100.2648 
2.099695 
.6576245 
.3594771 
.0803006 
.0588235 
.0600395 
6.940441 
.6546588 
550.3133 
4987.71 
258.8208 
62.72741 
169.2244 
57.53063 
49.27669 
217.367 
503.6642 
13.36345 
.3221251 
.4798885 
.2717849 
.235312 
.2375781 
1.494145 
.4755155 
0 
191.8416 
0 
0 
-.7 
-.1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
3.6 
0 
19 352 
26 351.89 
5 806.3 
1 200 
2 714.2 
786.4 
656.4 
1 952.1 
5 806.3 
210.5 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
11.9 
1 
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Table A–3. Alternative Regression Table:  
Determinants of Bilateral Aid (without Institutions) 
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent variable: Total 
Aid 
Infrastr. 
Aid 
Social 
Aid 
Prodn. 
Aid 
Debt 
Aid 
Mult. 
Aid 
Prog. 
Aid 
Emerg. 
Aid 
Intercept -32.68a 
(1.59) 
-25.24a 
(2.52) 
-25.70a 
(1.61) 
-25.58a 
(1.68) 
-1.36 
(4.67) 
-14.27a 
(2.46) 
-24.09a 
(2.14) 
-3.82c 
(2.00) 
ln GDP/cap. 
recipient country 
1.19a 
(0.27) 
2.22a 
(0.44) 
1.05a 
(0.29) 
0.90a 
(0.28) 
-0.49 
(0.76) 
0.19 
(0.35) 
0.71 
(0.47) 
-1.41a 
(0.38) 
ln GDP/cap. sq. 
recipient country 
-0.11a 
(0.02) 
-0.17a 
(0.03) 
-0.09a 
(0.02) 
-0.08a 
(0.02) 
0.04 
(0.06) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
-0.06 
(0.04) 
0.09a 
(0.03) 
ln population 
recipient country 
0.41a 
(0.02) 
0.34a 
(0.03) 
0.31a 
(0.02) 
0.31a 
(0.02) 
0.34a 
(0.05) 
0.23a 
(0.02) 
0.41a 
(0.03) 
0.06b 
(0.03) 
ln GDP/cap. Donor 
country 
1.15a 
(0.12) 
0.35b 
(0.15) 
1.02a 
(0.13) 
0.89a 
(0.13) 
-0.15 
(0.38) 
0.34c 
(0.19) 
0.82a 
(0.19) 
0.59a 
(0.17) 
ln GDP donor 
country 
0.64a 
(0.03) 
0.51 a 
(0.04) 
0.43a 
(0.03) 
0.49a 
(0.03) 
0.03 
(0.07) 
0.36a 
(0.04) 
0.44a 
(0.04) 
0.12a 
(0.03) 
ln distance -0.36a 
(0.05) 
-0.26a 
(0.06) 
-0.27a 
(0.05) 
-0.27a 
(0.05) 
-0.30c 
(0.16) 
-0.23a 
(0.07) 
-0.29a 
(0.08) 
-0.17b 
(0.07) 
Common language 0.39a 
(0.08) 
-0.32a 
(0.09) 
0.15b 
(0.08) 
-0.09 
(0.07) 
0.34 
(0.22) 
-0.30a 
(0.08) 
0.26b 
(0.10) 
-0.04 
(0.12) 
Contiguity -0.33 
(0.37) 
-0.89 
0.70 
-1.30c 
(0.76) 
-0.10 
(0.55) 
-0.50 
(0.50) 
-1.09a 
(0.19) 
0.03 
(0.21) 
-0.09 
(0.35) 
Pair ever in colonial 
relationship 
1.09a 
(0.11) 
0.81a 
(0.10) 
0.98a 
(0.10) 
0.59a 
(0.10) 
0.33 
(0.26) 
0.86a 
(0.11) 
0.57a 
(0.17) 
-0.13 
(0.15) 
UN vote correlation 0.43a 
(0.14) 
0.84a 
(0.18) 
-0.02 
(0.13) 
0.31a 
(0.12) 
2.16a 
(0.34) 
0.10 
(0.18) 
-0.17 
(0.17) 
-0.34 
(0.27) 
USA-Egypt dummy 3.39a 
(0.10) 
2.73a 
(0.13) 
3.12a 
(0.09) 
1.94a 
(0.09) 
2.82a 
(0.25) 
1.93a 
(0.11) 
3.10a 
(0.12) 
0.00a 
(0.00) 
USA-Israel dummy 4.64a 
(0.16) 
7.18a 
(0.30) 
4.67a 
(0.19) 
0.00a 
(0.00) 
-2.91a 
(0.40) 
2.40a 
(0.24) 
4.76a 
(0.29) 
4.79a 
(0.33) 
N 18 154 6 528 10 340 8 490 1 719 4 366 7 063 3 456 
R2 0.17 0.271 0.249 0.281 0.239 0.213 0.295 0.1 
RMSE 2.116 2.028 2.01 1.955 1.967 1.883 1.24 1.161 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. The superscripts a, b and c denote significance at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent 
and 10 per cent levels respectively. See note to Table 1 in the text for full descriptions of the dependent 
variables, all of which are in logs. 
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